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September 2026 edition

The MCP Security Index

We independently scanned 21,010 Model Context Protocol servers. 13% scored D or F, 0% ship committed secrets, and 38% declare no authentication at all.

Frozen · captured · scoring rubric v2.9.0 · methodology

Graded D or F
13%no change

2,731 of 21,010 scanned servers carry a failing or near-failing security grade.

Committed secrets
0%no change

Live credentials found in published source — an attacker can use these as-is.

No declared auth
38%no change

No OAuth 2.1 or protected-resource metadata gating who may invoke the server's tools.

Graded A
36%no change

7,510 servers verifiably pass the controls that apply to them.

Grade distribution

The median MCP server scores 88/100. Half the corpus falls between 80 and 91.

21,010 scored servers

D/F trend
A7,510 · 36%B10,280 · 49%
C536 · 3%
D1,806 · 9%
F878 · 4%
6,282 unverifiable
Score distribution summary
Mean score80.3
Median score88
25th percentile80
75th percentile91
Lowest score11
Highest score100

Popularity does not mean safety

Adoption and security posture move independently. The most-installed servers are not the safest ones.

By GitHub stars

CohortserversAverage scoreGraded D/F
1,000+ stars229
73
22%
100–999 stars950
78
14%
10–99 stars2,192
80
12%
Under 10 stars14,953
85
4%

By monthly downloads

CohortserversAverage scoreGraded D/F
100k+/month34
82
12%
10k–100k/month93
78
13%
1k–10k/month1,330
84
7%
Under 1k/month5,945
86
4%

Authentication and live exposure

We reached 4,550 live MCP endpoints. Of those, 2% declared that authentication was required and then served their tool surface to an anonymous caller.

Live endpoints probed
4,550

Servers we connected to and spoke MCP with directly.

Auth declared but not enforced
2%

Of probed endpoints — documented auth that anonymous callers get straight past.

Tool-poisoning markers
1%

Hidden instructions found in tool descriptions, which hijack the calling agent.

Attack surface and ecosystem

More exposed tools means more ways to be wrong. Ecosystem mix shows where the risk concentrates.

By number of exposed tools

CohortserversAverage scoreGraded D/F
No tools5,036
81
4%
1–5 tools6,278
81
14%
6–20 tools6,786
81
15%
20+ tools2,910
76
20%

By package ecosystem

CohortserversAverage scoreGraded D/F
repo / remote-only9,952
75
21%
npm7,668
86
4%
pypi3,037
82
8%
mcpb231
86
3%
nuget89
88
4%
cargo33
84
6%

What the ecosystem fails most

Every control in the catalog, ranked by failure rate within each domain. Failure rates are a share of servers where the control actually applied and could be evaluated.

Code safety

ControlFailure rateFailedWarnedEvaluated
No command-injection sinksGuardcode.no_command_injection
3%
55719219,373
No dynamic code executionGuardcode.no_code_eval
1%
2184219,373
No unsafe deserializationGuardcode.no_unsafe_deserialize
0%
951019,373
No path traversalGuardcode.no_path_traversal
0%
03,41719,373
No SSRF sinksGuardcode.no_ssrf
0%
06,17019,373

Secrets & credentials

ControlFailure rateFailedWarnedEvaluated
No committed secretsGuardsecrets.no_committed_secrets
0%
0019,373
Credentials sourced from environmentsecrets.from_env
0%
06,98319,373

Dependencies & supply chain

ControlFailure rateFailedWarnedEvaluated
No install/post-install scriptsGuardsupply.no_install_scripts
5%
35007,660
Package name not typosquattingGuardsupply.not_typosquatting
0%
8010,680
No known-vulnerable dependenciessupply.no_known_vulns
0%
03,39313,675
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)supply.deps_pinned
0%
014,37419,373
Published with provenancesupply.provenance
0%
05,9077,660
Established maintainersupply.maintainer_established
0%
09,63510,680

Tool integrity

ControlFailure rateFailedWarnedEvaluated
No over-broad / destructive toolsGuardtool.no_destructive_scope
2%
310015,974
Tool descriptions free of injection markersGuardtool.no_injection_markers
2%
246015,974
No risky post-publish tool changes (rug-pull)Guardtool.no_rug_pull
0%
91,0485,726
Strict tool input schemastool.schemas_strict
0%
013,04414,699

Auth & transport

ControlFailure rateFailedWarnedEvaluated
Remote endpoints use TLSGuardtransport.uses_tls
0%
009,275
Authentication declaredauth.declared
0%
08,0279,275
Execution sandboxingdeploy.sandboxed
0%
015,53519,373
Live endpoint reachabledynamic.reachable
0%
000
Authentication enforceddynamic.auth_enforced
0%
000
No bind-all / exposed debugtransport.no_bind_all
0%
02,80019,373

Maintenance & governance

ControlFailure rateFailedWarnedEvaluated
Repository not archivedGuardmaint.not_archived
1%
198018,324
Actively maintainedmaint.actively_maintained
0%
060218,324
Declares a licensegov.declares_license
0%
03,79918,324
Has a security policygov.security_policy
0%
015,22419,373
Signed releasesgov.signed_releases
0%
000
Adoption & popularityreputation.adoption
0%
010,58919,348

How much we could verify

Absence of evidence is not safety. A partially-scannable server cannot present a high score, so confidence caps it.

CohortserversAverage scoreGraded D/F
High (80%+ verified)16,692
85
6%
60–80% verified2,681
78
4%
Low (under 40% verified)1,637
40
100%

A further 6,282 listed servers declare no public repository or their source cannot be retrieved. They are listed without a score rather than given an invented one.

How to read these numbers

How often does the MCP Security Index update?
The live page recomputes from the database continuously; a permanent edition is frozen at the end of every calendar month at /mcp-security-index/YYYY-MM. Servers themselves are re-ingested and re-scanned every six hours, so a score change shows up on the live page the same day.
What does a D or F grade actually mean?
Grades come from a 0–100 score: A is 90 and up, B 75–89, C 60–74, D 40–59, F below 40. A confirmed security flaw caps the score outright — a server with a verified command-injection sink cannot exceed 20 no matter how good the rest of it is — so D and F overwhelmingly indicate a specific, evidenced problem rather than a general lack of polish.
Are month-over-month deltas comparing the same servers?
No. Distribution deltas cover the whole corpus, which grows as new servers are ingested, so part of any shift is composition rather than servers changing. The 'biggest score drops' section is the cohort-stable view: those are specific servers that were re-scanned and scored lower than before.
Why are some listed servers not scored at all?
If a server declares no public repository, or its source cannot be retrieved because it is private, moved, or removed, there is nothing to verify. Those are listed as unverified with no score rather than given an invented number, and they are excluded from every percentage on this page.
What counts as 'no authentication'?
A server that declares no authentication mechanism — no OAuth 2.1, no protected-resource metadata — so nothing gates who may invoke its tools. Separately, among servers whose live endpoints we probed, some declare that auth is required and then serve their full tool surface to an anonymous caller; that is reported as 'auth declared but not enforced'.
Can I use these numbers in my own work?
Yes. The full dataset behind each edition is downloadable as JSON and CSV from the page itself. Cite the Canopii Trust Index and link to the specific monthly edition you used, so the numbers you quoted remain verifiable.

Take the data

Every number on this page is downloadable. Attribution to the Canopii Trust Index is all we ask.

Looking for a specific server? Browse the full directory — every server page shows its complete control checklist with the evidence behind each result.