Is Vault-Agent-Memory safe to use?

Vault-Agent-Memory scores 80/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 12 of the 20 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.

How reliable is the security score for Vault-Agent-Memory?

We could evaluate 76% of the controls that apply to Vault-Agent-Memory. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

How was Vault-Agent-Memory scored?

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Vault-Agent-Memory MCP Server Security Report

zycaskevin/Vault-Agent-Memory

Local-first memory governance for AI agents: shared, reviewable, auditable memory via SQLite and MCP.

80B

Security Trust Score

Grade B · Moderate posture

Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 76%latest vmain@3e30a99 Repository

Declared MCP capabilities

ToolsResourcesPrompts

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The short answer

Is Vault-Agent-Memory safe to use?: Vault-Agent-Memory scores 80/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 12 of the 20 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for Vault-Agent-Memory?: We could evaluate 76% of the controls that apply to Vault-Agent-Memory. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was Vault-Agent-Memory scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Reputation47stars11forks17open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@3e30a99

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Pass
Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Not checked
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
Not checked
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
N/A
Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

Warn
No SSRF sinksguard2 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
benchmarks/agentmemory_compare.py:289benchmarks/external_memory_compare.py:1635
Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
Warn
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).
Warn
Has a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
Pass
No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
Pass
No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
Pass
No path traversalguardno sinks found
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
Pass
No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Pass
Actively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Pass
Repository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Pass
Declares a licenseApache-2.0
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Pass
Adoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Not checked
No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
N/A
No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
N/A
Package name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
N/A
Published with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
N/A
Established maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
Pass
Network Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
N/A
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
N/A
IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
vmain@3e30a99latest	80B	scored	8/9/2026

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.