CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →

solomd MCP Server Security Report

zhitongblog/solomd

A markdown editor — and the bridge to your LLM. Local-first, MIT, ~15 MB. Bundled MCP server lets Claude Code / Codex / Cursor drive your vault directly. 14 AI providers BYOK.

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmain@1eadbf3 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

Host zhitongblog/solomd in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Are you the maintainer?

Verify with GitHub to get alerted whenever zhitongblog/solomd changes score — and claim the badge for your README.

Claim this server

The short answer

Is solomd safe to use?
solomd scores 84/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 13 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for solomd?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to solomd. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was solomd scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation1.5kstars109forks65open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@1eadbf3

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard140 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    app/scripts/solomd-export.mjs:75app/scripts/solomd-export.mjs:180app/scripts/solomd-export.mjs:452app/scripts/solomd-export.mjs:467

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard4 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    app/src/lib/check-update.ts:102app/src/lib/diagram-export.ts:83app/src/lib/image-clipboard.ts:97app/src/lib/katex-standalone.ts:29

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Credentials sourced from environmentno env-based config detected

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

    Fix: Read credentials from environment variables or a secret manager.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies47 of 1210 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — GHSA-39q2-94rc-95cp[email protected] — GHSA-55q2-fjhq-7xh7[email protected] — GHSA-6688-9rhm-gjv2[email protected] — GHSA-76mc-f452-cxcm

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Embed this score

Add the live badge to your README — it updates automatically on every rescan.

Canopii Trust Score badge preview
markdown[![Canopii Trust Score](https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/zhitongblog/solomd)](https://index.canopii.dev/server/zhitongblog/solomd)
html<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/zhitongblog/solomd"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/zhitongblog/solomd" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>

Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@1eadbf3latest84Bscored
vmain@219a6ba84Bscored
vmain@80d579884Bscored
vmain@284b5dd84Bscored
vmain@453f2fc84Bscored
vmain@e9d797a84Bscored
vmain@92c5fc584Bscored
vmain@29cf1d084Bscored
vmain@6bbded384Bscored
vmain@cce80c484Bscored
vmain@1f9515d84Bscored
vmain@04cc90584Bscored
vmain@4284d1984Bscored
vmain@66dddd984Bscored
vmain@fbdfae784Bscored
vmain@8b4384a84Bscored
vmain@1889ef684Bscored
vmain@03d38a684Bscored
vmain@35e8fef85Bscored
vmain@4ccc60085Bscored
vmain@12cf95484Bscored
vmain@051972985Bscored
vmain@015b2a385Bscored
vmain@bf49ac185Bscored
vmain@8be38f686Bscored
vmain@10b22b286Bscored
vmain@5982f7286Bscored
vmain@ff3a65086Bscored
vmain@79c433b85Bscored
vmain@e8f014e86Bscored
vmain@47d5f2e85Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.