mcp MCP Server Security Report
Ethereum data for agents: blocks, transactions, traces, tokens, and facts about addresses.
This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.
- highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 2 marker(s) across 2 tool(s)
- mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 2 over-broad tool(s)
The short answer
- Is mcp safe to use?
- mcp scores 19/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 2 confirmed security failures that cap its score: Tool descriptions free of injection markers and No over-broad / destructive tools. It passes 1 of the 21 controls that apply to it.
- What security issues does mcp have?
- mcp fails 2 controls: Tool descriptions free of injection markers and No over-broad / destructive tools. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
- How reliable is the security score for mcp?
- We could evaluate 24% of the controls that apply to mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
- How was mcp scored?
- Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Security controlslatest scored version v0.2.0+acd465fb
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controlslatest scored version v0.2.0+acd465fb
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- FailIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard2 marker(s) across 2 tool(s)
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?
get_block_participants — exfiltration directiveget_pool_swaps — exfiltration directiveFix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.
- FailUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard2 over-broad tool(s)
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?
get_contract_control_historyget_transaction_account_changesFix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.
- Not checkedStrict JSON Schema Enforcementno source files
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
- N/ATool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
Application Security Checks
- Not checkedNo command-injection sinksguardno source
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
- Not checkedNo dynamic code executionguardno source
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
- Not checkedNo path traversalguardno source
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
- Not checkedNo SSRF sinksguardno source
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
- Not checkedNo unsafe deserializationguardno source
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- Not checkedNo committed secretsguardno source
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- Not checkedCredentials sourced from environmentno source files
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- Not checkedDependencies pinned (lockfile)no source files
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
- Not checkedActively maintainedno GitHub repository
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- Not checkedRepository not archivedguardno GitHub repository
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- Not checkedDeclares a licenseno GitHub repository
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- Not checkedHas a security policyno source files
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
- Not checkedAdoption & popularityno adoption signal
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- N/ANo known-vulnerable dependenciesno dependencies to scan
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
- N/ANo install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- N/APackage name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- N/APublished with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- N/AEstablished maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnIAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.
- PassTransport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- Not checkedExecution Sandboxingno source files
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
- Not checkedNetwork Exposureno source files
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.
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[](https://index.canopii.dev/server/xyz.tracefast/mcp)<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/xyz.tracefast/mcp"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/xyz.tracefast/mcp" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>Versions
| Version | Score | Status | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| v0.2.0+acd465fblatest | 19F | scored | 11/17/2026 |
| v0.1.0+e9df2df8 | — | unverified | 11/14/2026 |
Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.