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mcp MCP Server Security Report

xyz.tracefast/mcp

Ethereum data for agents: blocks, transactions, traces, tokens, and facts about addresses.

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 2 · Live endpointLow confidence · 24%latest v0.2.0+acd465fb
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

2 issues capping this score
  • highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 2 marker(s) across 2 tool(s)
  • mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 2 over-broad tool(s)

The short answer

Is mcp safe to use?
mcp scores 19/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 2 confirmed security failures that cap its score: Tool descriptions free of injection markers and No over-broad / destructive tools. It passes 1 of the 21 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does mcp have?
mcp fails 2 controls: Tool descriptions free of injection markers and No over-broad / destructive tools. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for mcp?
We could evaluate 24% of the controls that apply to mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was mcp scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Security controlslatest scored version v0.2.0+acd465fb

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard2 marker(s) across 2 tool(s)

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?

    get_block_participants — exfiltration directiveget_pool_swaps — exfiltration directive

    Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.

  • Fail
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard2 over-broad tool(s)

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?

    get_contract_control_historyget_transaction_account_changes

    Fix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.

  • Not checked
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno source files

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Not checked
    No command-injection sinksguardno source

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Not checked
    No dynamic code executionguardno source

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Not checked
    No path traversalguardno source

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Not checked
    No SSRF sinksguardno source

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Not checked
    No unsafe deserializationguardno source

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Not checked
    No committed secretsguardno source

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Not checked
    Credentials sourced from environmentno source files

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Not checked
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no source files

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Not checked
    Actively maintainedno GitHub repository

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Not checked
    Repository not archivedguardno GitHub repository

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Declares a licenseno GitHub repository

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    Has a security policyno source files

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • Not checked
    Adoption & popularityno adoption signal

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • N/A
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno dependencies to scan

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Not checked
    Execution Sandboxingno source files

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Not checked
    Network Exposureno source files

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
v0.2.0+acd465fblatest19Fscored
v0.1.0+e9df2df8—unverified

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.