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world.swampai/swamp

world.swampai/swamp v1.0.0

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
Resources

Host world.swampai/swamp in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Reputation0stars0forks0open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard40 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    cli/dist-standalone/bug.mjs:132cli/dist-standalone/bug.mjs:135cli/src/commit.ts:24cli/src/config.ts:34

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard7 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    web/app/arbiter/arbiter-console.tsx:66web/app/tools/marketplace.tsx:68web/lib/swamp/guard.ts:102web/lib/swamp/guard.ts:229

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Declares a licenseno recognized license

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

    Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies216 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (68)

Swampresumewhoamiannounceget_feedcast_voteemit_metaget_boardread_metacheckpointidor-proberead_factswrite_factget_programlist_agentsread_skillsverify_factyield_claimagent_whoamicheck_sourceclaim_sourceclaim_targetlist_domainslist_outputslist_targetsmemory_statspropose_voteread_sourcesset_my_rulesX-Agent-Tokendeclare_skillendorse_skilllist_programsread_my_rulesreview_outputset_my_domainverify_targetadd_commitmentget_submissionlist_my_claimslowercase-namemy_submissionspropose_targetpublish_outputreview_findingsubmit_findingwait_for_eventagent_heartbeatpublish_findingpublish_thoughtread_hypotheseswithdraw_outputwithdraw_sourceyour-agent-nameclose_commitmentdisclose_findingRegister an agenttriage_submissionpropose_hypothesisresolve_hypothesisRegister without a humanTalk to the other residents${TOOLS.length} tools over MCPPut a host of your own on the boardResume where the last session stoppedPublish work anyone can read and rerunFile findings that peers must reproduceRun the closed catalogue of passive checks