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tableau-mcp MCP Server Security Report

tableau/tableau-mcp

Tableau's official MCP Server. Helping agents see and understand data.

Security Trust Score
Grade A · Strong posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmain@2890d11 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

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The short answer

Is tableau-mcp safe to use?
tableau-mcp scores 90/100 (grade A) on the Canopii Trust Index — strong posture. It passes 17 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for tableau-mcp?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to tableau-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was tableau-mcp scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation371stars150forks108open issuestodaylast commit2yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@2890d11

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard110 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    docs/scripts/check-removed-tool-names.mjs:39src/activityLog/init.ts:132src/activityLog/init.ts:132src/config.shared.ts:69

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard4 occurrences (build/test paths only)

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    src/desktop/externalApi/externalApiContract.test.ts:688src/desktop/externalApi/externalApiContract.test.ts:1213src/desktop/externalApi/externalApiToolExecutor.test.ts:899src/desktop/externalApi/externalApiToolExecutor.test.ts:904

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies34 of 1421 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — GHSA-rj75-hqrm-r3gf[email protected] — GHSA-27r3-jxmh-p828[email protected] — GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p[email protected] — GHSA-q2hr-2g5m-vwhr

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseApache-2.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@2890d11latest90Ascored
vmain@564e2f690Ascored
vmain@6373f6690Ascored
vmain@bdf204590Ascored
vmain@00f74d790Ascored
vmain@8022e5290Ascored
vmain@e22d07590Ascored
vmain@86b058f90Ascored
vmain@849985690Ascored
vmain@f84889d90Ascored
vmain@b1c49d290Ascored
vmain@52e3bd490Ascored
vmain@37c621290Ascored
vmain@376f18790Ascored
vmain@28e886c88Bscored
vmain@25a9a9088Bscored
vmain@049690688Bscored
vmain@13a54cb88Bscored
vmain@755bd5f88Bscored
vmain@4fe8cdf88Bscored
vmain@2eefd7688Bscored
vmain@6db0f4488Bscored
vmain@771ea8188Bscored
vmain@5524d1888Bscored
vmain@ec115c488Bscored
vmain@eadb5d488Bscored
vmain@6270a7a88Bscored
vmain@aafc9e688Bscored
vmain@49ecd5f88Bscored
vmain@713339488Bscored
vmain@99765df88Bscored
vmain@f94826b88Bscored
vmain@3001e0588Bscored
vmain@33fee9388Bscored
vmain@13b721988Bscored
vmain@f85a7a088Bscored
vmain@8cdc05688Bscored
vmain@e4c57aa88Bscored
vmain@8b400a988Bscored
vmain@2bc5f1088Bscored
vmain@6dfe25288Bscored
vmain@7e9fc6688Bscored
vmain@2e3350488Bscored
vmain@368c74088Bscored
vmain@4338e6988Bscored
vmain@f255a2088Bscored
vmain@b1cc0ab88Bscored
vmain@aa5e8ba88Bscored
vmain@fedfab188Bscored
vmain@0710e0788Bscored
vmain@c5e4bb288Bscored
vmain@c314e1888Bscored
vmain@4e04b5788Bscored
vmain@af3347588Bscored
vmain@233f43388Bscored
vmain@fdb1a5b88Bscored
vmain@8e5166687Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.