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synapseorch-ai/synapse-ai

synapseorch-ai/synapse-ai vmaster@ae324c1

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

2 issues capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks5 occurrences
  • criticalNo dynamic code execution2 occurrences
Reputation306stars54forks2open issues9d agolast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard5 occurrences

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    bin/synapse.js:45scripts/bundle-frontend.js:17scripts/bundle-frontend.js:21scripts/bundle-frontend.js:46

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Fail
    No dynamic code executionguard2 occurrences

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution. How many servers fail this?

    backend/core/orchestration/steps.py:1544backend/core/orchestration/steps.py:1588

    Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard54 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    backend/core/routes/data.py:415bin/synapse.js:83bin/synapse.js:240bin/synapse.js:301

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard80 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    backend/core/routes/data.py:36backend/services/google.py:183backend/tools/pdf_parser.py:43backend/tools/xlsx_parser.py:42

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies4 of 207 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — GHSA-28wg-ghj8-5hjv[email protected] — GHSA-2v37-7h3g-55p8[email protected] — GHSA-4633-3j49-mh5q[email protected] — GHSA-4c39-4ccg-62r3

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseAGPL-3.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (2)

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