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linkedin-mcp-server MCP Server Security Report

stickerdaniel/linkedin-mcp-server

Open-source MCP server for LinkedIn. Give Claude and any MCP-compatible AI agent access to profiles, companies, jobs, and messages.

Security Trust Score
Grade A · Strong posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 90%latest vmain@8c3bb5a Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

Host stickerdaniel/linkedin-mcp-server in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

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The short answer

Is linkedin-mcp-server safe to use?
linkedin-mcp-server scores 92/100 (grade A) on the Canopii Trust Index — strong posture. It passes 15 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for linkedin-mcp-server?
We could evaluate 90% of the controls that apply to linkedin-mcp-server. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was linkedin-mcp-server scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation4.1kstars730forks184open issues4d agolast commit2yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@8c3bb5a

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard2 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    linkedin_mcp_server/error_diagnostics.py:274linkedin_mcp_server/update_check.py:113

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseApache-2.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@8c3bb5alatest92Ascored
vmain@fbe81ce92Ascored
vmain@d8a02a392Ascored
vmain@17be1db92Ascored
vmain@975cee692Ascored
vmain@59d05a692Ascored
vmain@a48e21c92Ascored
vmain@a94366692Ascored
vmain@0c5f14b92Ascored
vmain@7a4031092Ascored
vmain@62d723992Ascored
vmain@c76f8b492Ascored
vmain@9e0102e92Ascored
vmain@91329ef92Ascored
vmain@ed3b4dc92Ascored
vmain@a7e804489Bscored
vmain@dd3730392Ascored
vmain@a8e30d092Ascored
vmain@a61739495Ascored
vmain@8d4791894Ascored
vmain@f03f37791Ascored
vmain@b71682f91Ascored
vmain@ccd028b88Bscored
vmain@33c79cf89Bscored
vmain@27caa1e94Ascored
vmain@f0c146994Ascored
vmain@2b4d7bd94Ascored
vmain@6eb4d1f91Ascored
vmain@a7c4a5791Ascored
vmain@536618291Ascored
vmain@30f7bf094Ascored
vmain@750309c91Ascored
vmain@d1c1a9890Ascored
vmain@9f2cc9c90Ascored
vmain@f52cc5e90Ascored
vmain@7ac119090Ascored
vmain@4680f1d88Bscored
vmain@441f5e995Ascored
vmain@824c0f488Bscored
vmain@bddded195Ascored
vmain@91a8bd790Ascored
vmain@013c8a995Ascored
vmain@ca5999290Ascored
vmain@10d8d0190Ascored
vmain@74a1bf388Bscored
vmain@70e50ad86Bscored
vmain@974dfd086Bscored
vmain@13734ba88Bscored
vmain@f410bfd88Bscored
vmain@c5e5e5a88Bscored
vmain@991799c88Bscored
vmain@0cd1e5f88Bscored
vmain@35d949988Bscored
vmain@d0cbf1886Bscored
vmain@05756fd88Bscored
vmain@cfcd9c988Bscored
vmain@25f3a3b88Bscored
vmain@386b10788Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.