serac-labs/serac vmain@f87e520
This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.
- criticalNo command-injection sinks — 31 occurrences
Security controls
Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controls
Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- WarnStrict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
- PassIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
- PassUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
- N/ATool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
Application Security Checks
- FailNo command-injection sinksguard31 occurrences
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?
packages/servicenow-mcp/src/servicenow-mcp-unified/tools/automation/snow_execute_script.ts:189packages/servicenow-mcp/src/servicenow-mcp-unified/tools/blast-radius/shared/script-analyzer.ts:131packages/servicenow-mcp/src/servicenow-mcp-unified/tools/blast-radius/shared/script-analyzer.ts:140packages/servicenow-mcp/src/servicenow-mcp-unified/tools/blast-radius/shared/script-analyzer.ts:149Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.
- WarnNo path traversalguard79 occurrences
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
packages/servicenow-mcp/script/__tests__/published-manifests.test.ts:73packages/servicenow-mcp/script/__tests__/published-manifests.test.ts:94packages/servicenow-mcp/script/build-for-publish.ts:91packages/servicenow-mcp/script/check-registry-manifest.ts:78Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
- WarnNo SSRF sinksguard11 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
packages/servicenow-mcp/script/probe-sn-roles/sn.ts:53packages/servicenow-mcp/script/probe-sn-roles/sn.ts:98packages/servicenow-mcp/src/servicenow-mcp-unified/shared/auth.ts:516packages/servicenow-mcp/src/servicenow-mcp-unified/shared/auth.ts:577Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
- WarnDependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).
- PassNo dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassCredentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassRepository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- PassDeclares a licenseApache-2.0
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- PassHas a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
- PassAdoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- Not checkedNo known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
- N/ANo install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- N/APackage name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- N/APublished with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- N/AEstablished maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnExecution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
- PassNetwork Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
- N/ATransport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- N/AIAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.