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claude-mem-lite MCP Server Security Report

sdsrss/claude-mem-lite

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Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 76%latest vmain@7f66776 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ToolsResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

Host sdsrss/claude-mem-lite in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

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The short answer

Is claude-mem-lite safe to use?
claude-mem-lite scores 78/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 10 of the 20 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for claude-mem-lite?
We could evaluate 76% of the controls that apply to claude-mem-lite. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was claude-mem-lite scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation68stars14forks0open issues4d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@7f66776

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Not checked
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Not checked
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No command-injection sinksguard3 occurrences (build/test paths only)

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

    benchmark/efficacy-harness.mjs:77benchmark/efficacy-observational.mjs:69benchmark/efficacy-observational.mjs:83

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard46 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    bash-utils.mjs:146bash-utils.mjs:147bash-utils.mjs:150bash-utils.mjs:557

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard1 occurrence

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    haiku-client.mjs:690

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@7f66776latest78Bscored
vmain@868ab5a14Fscored
vmain@93a33a314Fscored
vmain@25e21f214Fscored
vmain@f3ccd2f14Fscored
vmain@3dda02a14Fscored
vmain@b84650a14Fscored
vmain@d3de97414Fscored
vmain@724be0914Fscored
vmain@ceb83ea14Fscored
vmain@8420ec614Fscored
vmain@92fdfad14Fscored
vmain@faa0d3316Fscored
vmain@03e9ef816Fscored
vmain@a12225016Fscored
vmain@1e4835a15Fscored
vmain@f7de23715Fscored
vmain@1d9aa5015Fscored
vmain@7272c5615Fscored
vmain@ff6295515Fscored
vmain@6e5439c93Ascored
vmain@cb5ddd316Fscored
vmain@0e31b3d15Fscored
vmain@d5cdc8215Fscored
vmain@124b7c515Fscored
vmain@5a1407615Fscored
vmain@af3582515Fscored
vmain@f25e8ae15Fscored
vmain@07b653d15Fscored
vmain@ca1881b16Fscored
vmain@234dc4817Fscored
vmain@9eb147116Fscored
vmain@fcd1ead16Fscored
vmain@62b5c4e16Fscored
vmain@7472b0516Fscored
vmain@852ad9d16Fscored
vmain@ee7cfb916Fscored
vmain@ed6b70e16Fscored
vmain@ca7be0d16Fscored
vmain@9699aab16Fscored
vmain@8cc2cf316Fscored
vmain@4b863ad16Fscored
vmain@b9ef32c16Fscored
vmain@26b092416Fscored
vmain@c9f381f16Fscored
vmain@1ec918516Fscored
vmain@cf81df816Fscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.

claude-mem-lite MCP Server Security — Score 78/100, Grade B · Canopii Trust Index