CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →
sandraschi/calibremcp

sandraschi/calibremcp vmaster@6a7dc62

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

2 issues capping this score
  • criticalNo dynamic code execution — 1 occurrence
  • highNo unsafe deserialization — 2 occurrences
Reputation38stars8forks5open issues11d agolast commit1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No dynamic code executionguard1 occurrence

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution. How many servers fail this?

    mcpb/src/calibre_mcp/tools/base_tool.py:119

    Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.

  • Fail
    No unsafe deserializationguard2 occurrences

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code. How many servers fail this?

    mcpb/src/calibre_mcp/config_discovery.py:144mcpb/src/calibre_mcp/config_discovery.py:290

    Fix: Use safe loaders (yaml.safe_load, JSON) on untrusted input.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard13 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    calibre-plugins/calibreops-bridge/client/calibreops_client.py:48calibre-plugins/calibreops-bridge/client/calibreops_client.py:62calibre_plugin/mcp_client.py:24calibre_plugin/mcp_client.py:38

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 of 37 runtime deps vulnerable; worst medium

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — RUSTSEC-2026-0190

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (69)

hellomy_toolcalculatehelp_tooltest_tooltool_functool_nameasync_taskmanage_xxxwrite_notehello_worldquery_bookssync_statustest_configtest_importexample_toolforce_rescangreet_personhealth_checklist_devicesmanage_booksmanage_filestest_importsmanage_importsystem_healthCalibreMCP 📚async_operationget_preferencesmanage_analysismanage_commentsmanage_metadatasearch_fulltextset_preferencesswitch_databaseclose_firefox_dbmanage_audiobookmanage_bookmarksmanage_librariessearch_bookmarksfetch_device_listget_device_statuslibrary_discoveryparse_device_datasync_health_checkget_bookmark_by_idget_tag_statisticsreading_statisticsget_series_analysismanage_content_syncmanage_descriptionsfind_duplicate_booksmanage_ai_operationsunread_priority_listauthenticate_nest_apiconnect_to_firefox_dbcount_total_bookmarksget_bookmark_overviewlist_bookmark_foldersanalyze_library_healthmanage_bulk_operationssearch_bookmarks_by_urlagentic_calibre_workflowagentic_library_workflowmanage_extended_metadataget_bookmark_table_schemamanage_library_operationssearch_bookmarks_by_titleintelligent_library_processingconversational_calibre_assistant
sandraschi/calibremcp vmaster@6a7dc62 — 15/100 · Canopii Trust Index