CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →

wmux MCP Server Security Report

openwong2kim/wmux

Run Claude Code, Codex & Gemini in parallel on Windows & macOS — git worktree fan-out with atomic hunk adoption, approval gates, reboot-surviving sessions

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmain@36e83dd Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

Are you the maintainer?

Verify with GitHub to get alerted whenever openwong2kim/wmux changes score — and claim the badge for your README.

Claim this server
1 issue capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 1 occurrence

The short answer

Is wmux safe to use?
wmux scores 17/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No command-injection sinks. It passes 16 of the 21 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does wmux have?
wmux fails 1 control: No command-injection sinks. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for wmux?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to wmux. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was wmux scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation447stars78forks44open issues1d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@36e83dd

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard1 occurrence

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    integrations/agy/bin/quota-sink.js:370

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard23 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    core/harness/esctest/adapter.ts:165core/harness/miner.ts:187core/harness/miner.ts:188core/harness/workloads.ts:117

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies100 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Embed this score

Add the live badge to your README — it updates automatically on every rescan.

Canopii Trust Score badge preview
markdown[![Canopii Trust Score](https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/openwong2kim/wmux)](https://index.canopii.dev/server/openwong2kim/wmux)
html<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/openwong2kim/wmux"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/openwong2kim/wmux" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>

Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@ab0c9f7—pending
vmain@36e83ddlatest17Fscored
vmain@d98ed3916Fscored
vmain@cb31b6415Fscored
vmain@5b7d5fe15Fscored
vmain@a94c87215Fscored
vmain@e97aa2f15Fscored
vmain@a9b08c615Fscored
vmain@17b559515Fscored
vmain@df29e7715Fscored
vmain@746d99815Fscored
vmain@2f51c0915Fscored
vmain@f470ff416Fscored
vmain@e7130c215Fscored
vmain@a28582d15Fscored
vmain@9403b0916Fscored
vmain@43a2c9615Fscored
vmain@60876af15Fscored
vmain@67b18f815Fscored
vmain@731235015Fscored
vmain@2b752e315Fscored
vmain@d204b6a15Fscored
vmain@cb693d115Fscored
vmain@364f26f15Fscored
vmain@35648ec15Fscored
vmain@491276615Fscored
vmain@9d7225615Fscored
vmain@568aa0315Fscored
vmain@9ee3dc015Fscored
vmain@ab18b7915Fscored
vmain@563048b15Fscored
vmain@b68af3e15Fscored
vmain@73f3ea877Bscored
vmain@9190baa14Fscored
vmain@277e3a977Bscored
vmain@07ea5ec14Fscored
vmain@eeb698d14Fscored
vmain@fd0b24d77Bscored
vmain@5f1b2ed14Fscored
vmain@a444ed914Fscored
vmain@4932cf214Fscored
vmain@95ebd5614Fscored
vmain@39b755414Fscored
vmain@8ef5f5d14Fscored
vmain@45ed6e914Fscored
vmain@3fb48d714Fscored
vmain@5b21cb614Fscored
vmain@73b37ef14Fscored
vmain@e1cd04d14Fscored
vmain@eb72ecb14Fscored
vmain@d1263ec14Fscored
vmain@05d91e814Fscored
vmain@ccebc1014Fscored
vmain@4fa18e514Fscored
vmain@40fb3dc14Fscored
vmain@e7a13a414Fscored
vmain@d86555514Fscored
vmain@ef5d73b14Fscored
vmain@7a5652314Fscored
vmain@3c82c5014Fscored
vmain@22c2a7814Fscored
vmain@f2309cc14Fscored
vmain@1b264a914Fscored
vmain@76978f514Fscored
vmain@8eb95e714Fscored
vmain@c4c4ca614Fscored
vmain@6681a9a14Fscored
vmain@505aaa314Fscored
vmain@6e823f614Fscored
vmain@72bbcc414Fscored
vmain@c630e4914Fscored
vmain@0d1b2c614Fscored
vmain@c0534f114Fscored
vmain@fb0a06d14Fscored
vmain@1d7ba0a14Fscored
vmain@68d534514Fscored
vmain@ee1008914Fscored
vmain@b7481ab14Fscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.