Is paper-search-mcp safe to use?

paper-search-mcp scores 62/100 (grade C) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No over-broad / destructive tools. It passes 16 of the 24 controls that apply to it.

What security issues does paper-search-mcp have?

paper-search-mcp fails 1 control: No over-broad / destructive tools. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.

How reliable is the security score for paper-search-mcp?

We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to paper-search-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

Does paper-search-mcp have any security advisories?

paper-search-mcp has 4 non-scoring advisories — observations worth a human review that deliberately do not affect the deterministic score, since they can be noisy.

How was paper-search-mcp scored?

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

paper-search-mcp MCP Server Security Report

openags/paper-search-mcp

MCP, CLI, Skills for searching and downloading academic papers from multiple sources like arXiv, PubMed, bioRxiv, etc.

62C

Security Trust Score

Grade C · Needs review

Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmain@cab1b5c Repository

Declared MCP capabilities

ResourcesPrompts

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1 issue capping this score

mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 1 over-broad tool(s)

The short answer

Is paper-search-mcp safe to use?: paper-search-mcp scores 62/100 (grade C) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No over-broad / destructive tools. It passes 16 of the 24 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does paper-search-mcp have?: paper-search-mcp fails 1 control: No over-broad / destructive tools. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for paper-search-mcp?: We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to paper-search-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
Does paper-search-mcp have any security advisories?: paper-search-mcp has 4 non-scoring advisories — observations worth a human review that deliberately do not affect the deterministic score, since they can be noisy.
How was paper-search-mcp scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Reputation2.8kstars295forks19open issues37d agolast commit2yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@cab1b5c

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Fail
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard1 over-broad tool(s)
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?
clear_search_cache
Fix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.
Warn
Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
Warn
Tool Definition Integrityguard4 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
search_paperssearch_ssrndownload_ieeeread_ieee_paper
Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.
Pass
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
Pass
In-Session Definition Integrityguardno call-gated or call-time tool definition changes
Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.

Application Security Checks

Warn
No SSRF sinksguard8 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
paper_search_mcp/academic_platforms/acm.py:81paper_search_mcp/academic_platforms/arxiv.py:250paper_search_mcp/academic_platforms/core.py:109paper_search_mcp/academic_platforms/iacr.py:247
Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
Warn
No known-vulnerable dependencies12 of 93 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
[email protected] — GHSA-5p39-cfhj-2xmp[email protected] — GHSA-82r6-8w77-94w6[email protected] — PYSEC-2026-4024[email protected] — PYSEC-2026-4025
Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
Warn
Has a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
Pass
No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
Pass
No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
Pass
No path traversalguardno sinks found
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
Pass
No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Pass
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Pass
Actively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Pass
Repository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Pass
Declares a licenseMIT
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Pass
Adoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
N/A
No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
N/A
Package name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
N/A
Published with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
N/A
Established maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.
Pass
No Token Passthroughguardno inbound token forwarded downstream
The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.
Pass
DNS-Rebinding ProtectionDNS-rebinding protection enabled
HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.
Pass
Execution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
N/A
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
N/A
IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

AI-flagged — for review

Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.

info
Tool "search_papers" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.
info
Tool "search_ssrn" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.
info
Tool "download_ieee" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

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Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
vmain@cab1b5clatest	62C	scored	10/2/2026
vmain@2dd3439	86B	scored	10/1/2026
vmain@808e462	89B	scored	9/22/2026
vmain@eabccbc	86B	scored	9/21/2026
vmain@8d30584	88B	scored	9/20/2026
vmain@234678a	91A	scored	8/17/2026
vmain@c8b6421	90A	scored	7/2/2026

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.