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trace-mcp MCP Server Security Report

nikolai-vysotskyi/trace-mcp

MCP server for Claude Code and Codex. One tool call replaces ~42 minutes of agent exploration

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmaster@2b911c6 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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1 issue capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 2 occurrences

The short answer

Is trace-mcp safe to use?
trace-mcp scores 15/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No command-injection sinks. It passes 14 of the 21 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does trace-mcp have?
trace-mcp fails 1 control: No command-injection sinks. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for trace-mcp?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to trace-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was trace-mcp scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation202stars24forks7open issues1d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmaster@2b911c6

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard2 occurrences

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    packages/app/scripts/patch-electron-dev.mjs:13packages/app/src/main/daemon-lifecycle.ts:69

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No dynamic code executionguard1 occurrence (build/test paths only)

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

    packages/app/src/renderer/__tests__/perf-driver.test.ts:19

    Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard53 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    benchmarks/skeleton-gate/eval.ts:415integrations/bb/server.ts:59integrations/bb/server.ts:62packages/app/scripts/electron-cdp.mjs:235

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard13 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    packages/app/scripts/electron-cdp.mjs:57packages/app/scripts/perf-measure.mjs:200packages/app/scripts/perf-measure.mjs:534packages/app/scripts/perf-screens.mjs:107

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies2 of 636 runtime deps vulnerable; worst medium

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — GHSA-g3hv-75wg-m249[email protected] — GHSA-g3hv-75wg-m249

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmaster@2b911c6latest15Fscored
vmaster@64861f515Fscored
vmaster@adac3f715Fscored
vmaster@b09293815Fscored
vmaster@0e5452015Fscored
vmaster@589386b16Fscored
vmaster@355a61c16Fscored
vmaster@6f5ec1015Fscored
vmaster@1c6deb215Fscored
vmaster@c8a988415Fscored
vmaster@3fc8dfc15Fscored
vmaster@c73f88415Fscored
vmaster@0a5c98515Fscored
vmaster@fa8dcd015Fscored
vmaster@73ac96b15Fscored
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vmaster@24db49715Fscored
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vmaster@8cdef7415Fscored
vmaster@54e140415Fscored
vmaster@e82b3c314Fscored
vmaster@01fdaa614Fscored
vmaster@f9f92fb14Fscored
vmaster@8b8113c14Fscored
vmaster@756b26d14Fscored
vmaster@a992ad314Fscored
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vmaster@b808aba14Fscored
vmaster@a493b1695Ascored
vmaster@c07dd1714Fscored
vmaster@dbb26ef14Fscored
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vmaster@1237b5214Fscored
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vmaster@8905aa415Fscored
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vmaster@cf3afd115Fscored
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vmaster@744cbf416Fscored
vmaster@28ff0de16Fscored
vmaster@f0de43716Fscored
vmaster@814965917Fscored
vmaster@47bb52416Fscored
vmaster@9aa50e616Fscored
vmaster@74b49f116Fscored
vmaster@b79ebf516Fscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.