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mksglu/context-mode

mksglu/context-mode vmain@04288af

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 89%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

1 issue capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks23 occurrences
Reputation20kstars1.4kforks143open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard23 occurrences

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    hooks/ensure-deps.mjs:75hooks/ensure-deps.mjs:242hooks/heal-partial-install.mjs:175hooks/heal-partial-install.mjs:335

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard146 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    hooks/cache-heal-utils.mjs:66hooks/cache-heal-utils.mjs:368hooks/codex/stop.mjs:47hooks/codex/userpromptsubmit.mjs:26

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard1 occurrence

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    hooks/platform-bridge.mjs:286

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Declares a licenseno recognized license

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

    Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (36)

ctx-statsctx_indexctx_purgectx_statsctx-doctorctx_doctorctx_searchctx-upgradectx_executectx_insightctx_upgradeIssues (React)Network requestsctx_execute_filePR list (Next.js)Tailwind CSS docsctx_batch_executePage snapshot (HN)git diff (6 files)ctx_fetch_and_indexAccess log (500 req)MCP tools (40 tools)React useEffect docsGit log (150+ commits)TypeScript errors (50)package.json (33 deps)API Response (15 users)Next.js App Router docsTest output (30 suites)Analytics CSV (500 rows)context-mode.session-newAccess log (500 requests)Build output (100+ lines)context-mode.session-stopSource code (200 lines TS)context-mode.session-reset