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mcpware/cross-code-organizer

mcpware/cross-code-organizer vmain@400f45e

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

3 issues capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 1 occurrence
  • highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
  • mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 10 over-broad tool(s)
Reputation366stars32forks11open issues2mo agolast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?

    Instruction override — 'ignore previous' override

    Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.

  • Fail
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard10 over-broad tool(s)

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?

    System prompt manipulationSystem file accessShell command executionReverse shell pattern

    Fix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard1 occurrence

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    bin/cli.mjs:143

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard58 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    research/audit_gemma_batched_crossfamily.py:23research/audit_raw_layer_sweep.py:21research/audit_topk_sae_ablation.py:19research/audit_whitebox_gcg_raw_probe.py:32

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard15 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    research/fetch_masb_skill_content.py:91src/mcp-introspector.mjs:144src/mcp-introspector.mjs:165src/ui/app.js:247

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies11 of 198 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    @hono/[email protected] — GHSA-92pp-h63x-v22m@hono/[email protected] — GHSA-frvp-7c67-39w9[email protected] — GHSA-v422-hmwv-36x6[email protected] — GHSA-4c8g-83qw-93j6

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (67)

githubJWT tokenmove_itemdelete_itemhistory.jsonlSSH key accessaudit_securityscan_inventoryAPI key patternBehavior overridePriority overridelist_destinationsAI/ML platform keyCurl pipe to shellSystem file accessNew role assignmentPrivate key contentTool call injectionsession_index.jsonlExternal data uploadInfrastructure tokenInstruction overrideOptimization pretextPrivilege escalationConcealment directiveEmphasis manipulationInstruction downgradeOutput format forcingReverse shell patternCredential file accessCross-server referencePath traversal patternDeceptive functionalityEnvironment file accessHidden instruction tagsHidden secondary actionMeta-command activationShell command executionTool override directiveInstruction invalidationSystem prompt extractionSystemd/cron persistenceThird-party data sharingDangerous system commandsEncoded command executionExfiltration via URL pathModel-specific delimitersSuspicious parameter nameRoleplay framing jailbreakShell profile modificationShell variable obfuscationSystem prompt manipulationHook variable interpolationMarkdown image exfiltrationCommunication platform tokenEnvironment variable secretsGeneric credential in configHook runs curl pipe to shellKnown exfiltration endpointsProcessing-time exfiltrationTool preference manipulationHook runs destructive commandNetwork exfiltration commandsExtended exfiltration endpointsMarkdown reference link exploitCross-tool behavior modificationAuto-install without confirmation