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opencaselaw MCP Server Security Report

jonashertner/opencaselaw

Open Swiss legal corpus + MCP server: 1M+ court decisions (1875–today), 21k laws, 10M-edge citation graph, 42 MCP tools. CC0 data, MIT code. Live at mcp.opencaselaw.ch

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 90%latest vmain@fd4daa4 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

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Host jonashertner/opencaselaw in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

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The short answer

Is opencaselaw safe to use?
opencaselaw scores 87/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 14 of the 21 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for opencaselaw?
We could evaluate 90% of the controls that apply to opencaselaw. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was opencaselaw scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation77stars16forks36open issues1d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@fd4daa4

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard2 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    agentic-research-desk-mvp/server.js:79agentic-research-desk-mvp/server.js:194

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard7 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    agentic-research-desk-mvp/public/app.js:28agentic-research-desk-mvp/src/opencaselaw-client.js:117audit_source_urls.py:80backfill_bstger_urls.py:114

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@442780a—pending
vmain@fd4daa4latest87Bscored
vmain@6b4543387Bscored
vmain@2d0099187Bscored
vmain@e7041d687Bscored
vmain@08b140387Bscored
vmain@ad18d9b87Bscored
vmain@50aa27d87Bscored
vmain@ef3d3e787Bscored
vmain@2961f9587Bscored
vmain@bfe85a087Bscored
vmain@86c723787Bscored
vmain@b43855d87Bscored
vmain@6eafb6687Bscored
vmain@290b54587Bscored
vmain@05c8a8587Bscored
vmain@f18d6ae87Bscored
vmain@e68ae5587Bscored
vmain@507a32d87Bscored
vmain@f769c0587Bscored
vmain@24a1cf087Bscored
vmain@42e2b2487Bscored
vmain@2f3eb9087Bscored
vmain@196bbab87Bscored
vmain@c6f140487Bscored
vmain@24d7a4487Bscored
vmain@8982b3688Bscored
vmain@45dd61088Bscored
vmain@b0e385788Bscored
vmain@c24f27688Bscored
vmain@581cf3488Bscored
vmain@ce0780588Bscored
vmain@7f29a8d88Bscored
vmain@9b97efb88Bscored
vmain@df14c8b88Bscored
vmain@570cad388Bscored
vmain@d35111d88Bscored
vmain@adbe08888Bscored
vmain@05a6dcd88Bscored
vmain@860931c88Bscored
vmain@6a9810988Bscored
vmain@5b85b5388Bscored
vmain@1670dc388Bscored
vmain@852319188Bscored
vmain@94b7bc588Bscored
vmain@b12c1ca88Bscored
vmain@89b046488Bscored
vmain@18ab19588Bscored
vmain@6c668bd88Bscored
vmain@dfeb2bb88Bscored
vmain@c107e8788Bscored
vmain@6b3f15188Bscored
vmain@eec92e088Bscored
vmain@e6eceb388Bscored
vmain@a28f4e288Bscored
vmain@c58bc8588Bscored
vmain@5b7314f88Bscored
vmain@77fda2388Bscored
vmain@4297f9388Bscored
vmain@0f8d0db88Bscored
vmain@ff7d35388Bscored
vmain@e8cc71490Ascored
vmain@0ee3edb92Ascored
vmain@e4a9f7792Ascored
vmain@b19cb4292Ascored
vmain@763d88592Ascored
vmain@851b63c92Ascored
vmain@5cf981892Ascored
vmain@4ec92ae92Ascored
vmain@907e6e292Ascored
vmain@17365ce92Ascored
vmain@55e88d492Ascored
vmain@576a1f292Ascored
vmain@46d8a5192Ascored
vmain@37df2d892Ascored
vmain@3ba97bb92Ascored
vmain@37690bd92Ascored
vmain@ba9da2192Ascored
vmain@d652e5c92Ascored
vmain@af4b48992Ascored
vmain@8dba4ff92Ascored
vmain@95ba3cd92Ascored
vmain@1ee370292Ascored
vmain@b0031e292Ascored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.