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agency-orchestrator MCP Server Security Report

jnMetaCode/agency-orchestrator

🚀 One sentence → your one-person company of AI experts → complete deliverable in minutes. 267 CN + 184 EN + 5 more languages (ko/ru/pt-BR/id/ar) · zero-code YAML · auto-verified acceptance · Web Studio / Desktop / Docker · 11 LLM providers (7 key-free). 一句话组建你的「一人公司」AI 专家团队，几分钟交付完整方案；验收自动核验，网页 / 桌面 / Docker 全渠道。

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest vmain@afc221b Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
Prompts

Run it securely

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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1 issue capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 3 occurrences

The short answer

Is agency-orchestrator safe to use?
agency-orchestrator scores 16/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No command-injection sinks. It passes 15 of the 21 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does agency-orchestrator have?
agency-orchestrator fails 1 control: No command-injection sinks. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for agency-orchestrator?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to agency-orchestrator. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was agency-orchestrator scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation2.4kstars322forks5open issues4d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version vmain@afc221b

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard3 occurrences

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    src/cli.ts:1647src/cli.ts:1793src/cli.ts:2057

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard60 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    desktop/main.cjs:80desktop/main.cjs:423desktop/main.cjs:423desktop/main.cjs:431

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard12 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    scripts/diagnose-batch.mjs:23scripts/metrics.mjs:13src/cli.ts:802src/cli/demo.ts:62

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies13 of 148 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    @hono/[email protected] — GHSA-rmxm-3fg6-px4f@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] — GHSA-22jm-h49p-29qw@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] — GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] — GHSA-6prh-2h8m-c8cw

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseApache-2.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
vmain@afc221blatest16Fscored
vmain@5d82e7116Fscored
vmain@5020bff16Fscored
vmain@331422916Fscored
vmain@df598c216Fscored
vmain@367882216Fscored
vmain@3aaf05d16Fscored
vmain@1517c5916Fscored
vmain@2f4b95116Fscored
vmain@346dbbf16Fscored
vmain@b659a2f16Fscored
vmain@7e0a58f16Fscored
vmain@9675b5a16Fscored
vmain@713349c16Fscored
vmain@bed661316Fscored
vmain@e03ac9916Fscored
vmain@47d9b6f16Fscored
vmain@c5d6af616Fscored
vmain@33937ed16Fscored
vmain@1f36dba16Fscored
vmain@4239e5a16Fscored
vmain@43cbaa416Fscored
vmain@0b41c9816Fscored
vmain@918361b16Fscored
vmain@cbed23d16Fscored
vmain@0cb821b16Fscored
vmain@ec88b5b16Fscored
vmain@666dbff16Fscored
vmain@a528dcb16Fscored
vmain@a0baa4c16Fscored
vmain@be7eba816Fscored
vmain@1d2881716Fscored
vmain@8d647f916Fscored
vmain@389dc6116Fscored
vmain@c7d303d16Fscored
vmain@0f1642816Fscored
vmain@e3b052d16Fscored
vmain@40ebb3d16Fscored
vmain@f02809d15Fscored
vmain@e53140916Fscored
vmain@2d3411b16Fscored
vmain@07aac7516Fscored
vmain@58b56c715Fscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.