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applaunchflow MCP Server Security Report

io.github.ynnickw/applaunchflow

Create app-store screenshots, social graphics, promo videos, and animated device mockups.

Security Trust Score
Grade D · Weak posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest v0.8.10 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities

Run it securely

This server scored D. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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Claim this server
1 issue capping this score
  • highNo risky post-publish tool changes (rug-pull) — 1 risky tool-definition change(s) in version history (0.3.10 → 0.3.12)

The short answer

Is applaunchflow safe to use?
applaunchflow scores 40/100 (grade D) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No risky post-publish tool changes (rug-pull). It passes 14 of the 23 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does applaunchflow have?
applaunchflow fails 1 control: No risky post-publish tool changes (rug-pull). Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for applaunchflow?
We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to applaunchflow. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was applaunchflow scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation0stars0forks0open issues4d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version v0.8.10

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Tool Definition Integrityguard1 risky tool-definition change(s) in version history (0.3.10 → 0.3.12)

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns. How many servers fail this?

    clear_promo_video

    Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard42 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    scripts/picker-release.mjs:118scripts/sync-dashboard.mjs:7src/asset-overwrite.test.ts:23src/asset-tools.test.ts:37

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard33 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    src/client/api.ts:96src/client/api.ts:178src/client/api.ts:728src/client/official.ts:236

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies2 of 17 runtime deps vulnerable; worst medium

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    @hono/[email protected] — GHSA-jpvv-r467-5p4w@hono/[email protected] — GHSA-qv5m-9pm6-hqp3[email protected] — GHSA-3gg2-335m-rxc6[email protected] — GHSA-46wx-v44x-9hh2

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Declares a licenseno recognized license

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

    Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    IAM / Authentication ScopingOAuth / PRM handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
v0.8.10latest40Dscored
v0.8.990Ascored
v0.8.890Ascored
v0.8.790Ascored
v0.8.388Bscored
v0.8.058Dscored
v0.7.1258Dscored
v0.7.941Dscored
v0.7.860Cscored
v0.7.760Cscored
v0.7.661Cscored
v0.7.561Cscored
v0.7.461Cscored
v0.7.261Cscored
v0.7.060Cscored
v0.5.160Cscored
v0.4.061Cscored
v0.3.4560Cscored
v0.3.4260Cscored
v0.3.4061Cscored
v0.3.3761Cscored
v0.3.3461Cscored
v0.3.3161Cscored
v0.3.1360Cscored
v0.3.1260Cscored
v0.3.1089Bscored
v0.3.961Cscored
v0.3.861Cscored
v0.3.761Cscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.

applaunchflow MCP Server Security — Score 40/100, Grade D · Canopii Trust Index