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io.github.xhad/teamshared

io.github.xhad/teamshared v0.9.1

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 90%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

2 issues capping this score
  • highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
  • mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 2 over-broad tool(s)
Reputation0stars0forks0open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?

    file_upload_request — exfiltration directive

    Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.

  • Fail
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard2 over-broad tool(s)

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?

    memory_forget_procedurememory_forget_skill

    Fix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard1 occurrence

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    install/hermes/capture.py:126

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (94)

healthversionfile_getmcp_authwork_getfile_listwork_listwork_movework_closefile_createfile_updateproject_getwork_creatework_updatefile_archivefile_publishmemory_thinkproject_listmemory_forgetmemory_recallcontext_commitfile_unpublishproject_createproject_updatecontext_preparememory_remembermemory_soul_getmemory_soul_setproject_archivecontext_compresscontext_retrieveintegration_listintegration_readintegration_sendmemory_skill_getmemory_skill_setmemory_state_getmemory_state_setwork_comment_addcontext_normalizework_comment_listwork_follower_addintegration_searchmemory_entity_viewmemory_session_getmemory_skills_listwork_subtasks_listfile_upload_requestfile_version_deletememory_action_applymemory_forget_skillmemory_graph_relatememory_playbook_getmemory_playbook_setmemory_session_openproject_section_addproject_status_postwork_add_to_projectwork_dependency_addwork_followers_listmemory_episodes_listmemory_graph_relatedmemory_ontology_listmemory_procedure_getmemory_procedure_setmemory_session_closememory_skill_resolvememory_tools_catalogproject_section_listwork_follower_removememory_playbooks_listmemory_session_appendmemory_session_ensurememory_action_log_listmemory_procedures_listwork_dependencies_listwork_dependency_removememory_assemble_contextmemory_forget_procedurework_remove_from_projectmemory_strategic_plan_getmemory_strategic_plan_setmemory_strategic_plan_listmemory_strategic_entity_getmemory_ontology_link_type_setmemory_ontology_rekind_entitymemory_ontology_merge_entitiesmemory_ontology_propose_entitymemory_strategic_objective_setmemory_strategic_statement_getmemory_strategic_statement_setmemory_ontology_object_kind_setmemory_strategic_initiative_setmemory_strategic_key_result_set