CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →
io.github.veyanet/veya

io.github.veyanet/veya v1.2.8

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Host io.github.veyanet/veya in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Reputation0stars0forks0open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard20 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    scripts/smoke.ts:19scripts/smoke.ts:22scripts/user-agent.ts:83scripts/user-agent.ts:531

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard29 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    scripts/smoke.ts:9scripts/user-agent.ts:70scripts/user-agent.ts:122scripts/user-agent.ts:339

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 of 134 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    @modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] — GHSA-22jm-h49p-29qw@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] — GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] — GHSA-6prh-2h8m-c8cw@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] — GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (51)

veya_proveveya_accountveya_pq_signveya_describeveya_pq_keygenveya_pq_verifyveya_api_healthveya_ping_chainveya_guest_loginveya_hash_blake3veya_list_agentsveya_list_proofsveya_read_memoryveya_anchor_proofveya_deploy_agentveya_public_statsveya_store_memoryveya_route_messageveya_run_consensusveya_seal_decisionveya_writes_statusveya_pq_fingerprintveya_sealed_executeveya_boundnet_invokeveya_get_environmentveya_list_api_memoryveya_list_executionsveya_set_tool_policyveya_attest_executionveya_public_get_agentveya_store_commitmentveya_verify_proof_apiveya_commitment_existsveya_invalidate_memoryveya_list_environmentsveya_create_environmentveya_public_list_agentsveya_read_agent_onchainveya_verify_transactionveya_register_pq_onchainveya_client_run_consensusveya_public_get_executionveya_register_environmentveya_route_secure_messageveya_anchor_pq_attestationveya_verify_secure_messageveya_public_get_certificateveya_run_protected_executionveya_public_list_certificatesveya_read_environment_onchainveya_verify_commitment_onchain
io.github.veyanet/veya v1.2.8 — 83/100 · Canopii Trust Index