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io.github.trend0xai/trend0x

io.github.trend0xai/trend0x v3.5.0

Security Trust Score
Grade D · Weak posture
Tier 2 · Live endpointLow confidence · 21%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored D. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • Not checked
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno source files

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Not checked
    In-Session Definition Integrityguardno source

    Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Not checked
    No command-injection sinksguardno source

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Not checked
    No dynamic code executionguardno source

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Not checked
    No path traversalguardno source

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Not checked
    No SSRF sinksguardno source

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Not checked
    No unsafe deserializationguardno source

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Not checked
    No committed secretsguardno source

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Not checked
    Credentials sourced from environmentno source files

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Not checked
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no source files

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Not checked
    Actively maintainedno GitHub repository

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Not checked
    Repository not archivedguardno GitHub repository

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Declares a licenseno GitHub repository

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    Has a security policyno source files

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • Not checked
    Adoption & popularityno adoption signal

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • N/A
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno dependencies to scan

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Not checked
    No Token Passthroughguardno source

    The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.

  • Not checked
    DNS-Rebinding Protectionno source to inspect

    HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.

  • Not checked
    Execution Sandboxingno source files

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Not checked
    Network Exposureno source files

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (115)

list_taskscreate_taskget_balancemarket_newssocial_buzzrun_backteststrategy_hubagent_reportsexecute_tradehistory_queryokx_orderbookokx_positionsterminal_newstrade_confirmviral_updatesearnings_recapenable_scannerget_pnl_reportscanner_configscanner_statusbybit_orderbookbybit_positionscircuit_breakerdisable_scannerget_alpaca_newsget_market_dataokx_instrumentsokx_open_ordersokx_place_orderscanner_controlterminal_configticker_researchbacktest_resultsget_risk_metricsokx_agent_skillsokx_cancel_orderokx_set_leveragesentiment_signalterminal_moduleswatchlist_digestbinance_orderbookbinance_positionsbybit_open_ordersbybit_place_ordercognitive_controlmanage_strategiesokx_order_historyokx_trade_historyportfolio_historyrisk_reward_checkbybit_cancel_orderbybit_market_klinebybit_set_leverageget_alpaca_accountimplement_strategyokx_market_candlesokx_market_tickersrun_saved_strategyset_max_daily_lossupdate_task_statusassistant_operationbinance_open_ordersbybit_order_historybybit_trade_historycreate_scanner_taskemergency_close_allget_bitunix_balanceokx_account_balancepaper_profit_policybinance_agent_skillsbinance_funding_ratebybit_market_tickersbybit_wallet_balanceexecute_alpaca_tradefetch_terminal_stateget_alpaca_positionsget_bitpanda_tickerspause_saved_strategystart_paper_strategyaccount_risk_settingsbinance_exchange_infobinance_market_klinesbinance_market_tickerbinance_open_interestbinance_order_historybinance_trade_historyexecute_bitunix_tradefinancial_instrumentsget_bitunix_positionsget_portfolio_summaryportfolio_performanceupdate_strategy_rulesbinance_income_historybybit_instruments_infobybit_set_trading_stopget_bitpanda_portfolioget_exchange_positionsget_whitebit_portfolioperplexity_market_newsperplexity_social_buzzposition_sizing_policybinance_account_balancebybit_internal_transfercalculate_position_sizeget_performance_metricsperplexity_viral_updatesselect_strategy_exchangeupdate_strategy_exchangeperplexity_earnings_recapsend_markdown_to_telegramget_bitpanda_trade_historyperplexity_ticker_researchperplexity_sentiment_signalperplexity_watchlist_digestset_strategy_execution_selection