joy scores 15/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No command-injection sinks. It passes 14 of the 26 controls that apply to it.

What security issues does joy have?

joy fails 1 control: No command-injection sinks. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.

How reliable is the security score for joy?

We could evaluate 92% of the controls that apply to joy. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes, and its live endpoint was additionally probed to verify what it actually exposes. The full rubric is published.

joy MCP Server Security Report

io.github.tlkc888-Jenkins/joy

Trust infrastructure for AI agents. Portable reputation (JTS 0-5), agent discovery, vouching.

15F

Security Trust Score

Grade F · Serious issues

Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 92% Dynamically scannedlatest v2.40.0 Repository Publisher-verified

Declared MCP capabilities

ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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1 issue capping this score

criticalNo command-injection sinks — 1 occurrence

The short answer

Is joy safe to use?: joy scores 15/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No command-injection sinks. It passes 14 of the 26 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does joy have?: joy fails 1 control: No command-injection sinks. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for joy?: We could evaluate 92% of the controls that apply to joy. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was joy scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes, and its live endpoint was additionally probed to verify what it actually exposes. The full rubric is published.

Reputation131downloads/mo

Security controlslatest scored version v2.40.0

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Warn
Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
Pass
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
Pass
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
N/A
Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

Fail
No command-injection sinksguard1 occurrence
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?
cli/index.js:116
Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.
Warn
No path traversalguard14 occurrences
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
autonomous-moderator.js:221cli/index.js:210docs/autogpt_research/autogpt_platform/backend/load-tests/generate-tokens.js:110docs/autogpt_research/autogpt_platform/cloudflare_worker.js:60
Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
Warn
No SSRF sinksguard47 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
agents/code-reviewer/agent.py:51agents/researcher/agent.py:51autonomous-moderator.js:72autonomous-moderator.js:227
Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
Warn
No known-vulnerable dependencies30 of 278 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
[email protected] — PYSEC-2026-2132[email protected] — GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf[email protected] — GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5[email protected] — GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww
Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
Warn
Published with provenanceno provenance attestation
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
Fix: Publish with npm provenance (--provenance) from a trusted CI.
Warn
Established maintainersingle maintainer
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.
Pass
No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
Pass
No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Pass
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Pass
No install/post-install scriptsguardno install scripts
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
Pass
Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
Pass
Has a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Pass
Adoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Not checked
Actively maintainedGitHub API unavailable
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Not checked
Repository not archivedguardGitHub API unavailable
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Not checked
Declares a licenseGitHub API unavailable
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.
Pass
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
Pass
IAM / Authentication ScopingOAuth / PRM handling detected
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
Pass
Execution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
v2.40.0latest	15F	scored	5/6/2026

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.