pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault MCP Server Security Report
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Run it securely
This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.
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Claim this server- criticalNo command-injection sinks — 1 occurrence
The short answer
- Is pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault safe to use?
- pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault scores 15/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No command-injection sinks. It passes 13 of the 25 controls that apply to it.
- What security issues does pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault have?
- pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault fails 1 control: No command-injection sinks. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
- How reliable is the security score for pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault?
- We could evaluate 92% of the controls that apply to pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
- Does pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault have any security advisories?
- pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault has 1 non-scoring advisory — observations worth a human review that deliberately do not affect the deterministic score, since they can be noisy.
- How was pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault scored?
- Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Security controlslatest scored version v1.6.0
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controlslatest scored version v1.6.0
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- WarnStrict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
- WarnTool Definition Integrityguard1 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
vault_feedbackFix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.
- PassIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
- PassUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
Application Security Checks
- FailNo command-injection sinksguard1 occurrence
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?
docker/qmd/server.mjs:25Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.
- WarnNo path traversalguard1 occurrence
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
docker/qmd/server.mjs:117Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
- WarnNo known-vulnerable dependencies12 of 130 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
[email protected] — PYSEC-2026-2132[email protected] — GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf[email protected] — GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5[email protected] — GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82wwFix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
- WarnEstablished maintainerrecently published
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.
- WarnHas a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
- WarnAdoption & popularitylimited adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.
- PassNo dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
- PassNo SSRF sinksguardno sinks found
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassCredentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- PassDependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
- PassPackage name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassRepository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- PassDeclares a licenseApache-2.0
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- Not checkedNo install/post-install scriptsguardnot determinable from PyPI metadata
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- Not checkedPublished with provenancenot determinable
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnNetwork Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.
- PassExecution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
- N/ATransport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- N/AIAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.
AI-flagged — for review
Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.
- infoTool "vault_feedback" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.
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[](https://index.canopii.dev/server/io.github.synpulse8-opensource/pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault)<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/io.github.synpulse8-opensource/pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/io.github.synpulse8-opensource/pulse8-ai-cortex-knowledge-vault" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>Versions
Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.