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io.github.sassoftware/sas-mcp-server

io.github.sassoftware/sas-mcp-server v1.15.0

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
Resources

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

2 issues capping this score
  • highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
  • mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 1 over-broad tool(s)
Reputation57stars20forks0open issues11d agolast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?

    list_glossary_term_types — pre-action injection

    Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.

  • Fail
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard1 over-broad tool(s)

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?

    lock_business_ruleset_revision

    Fix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.

  • Warn
    Tool Definition Integrityguard1 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

    import_glossary_terms

    Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard1 occurrence

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    src/sas_mcp_server/ui/shell.js:190

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard1 occurrence (build/test paths only)

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    scripts/vendor_ext_apps.py:62

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 of 87 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5[email protected] — PYSEC-2026-3552

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseApache-2.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (80)

list_jobscancel_joblist_filesquery_dataget_job_logupload_dataupload_filelist_caslibsdownload_filecatalog_searchget_job_statuslist_castablesrun_ml_projectexecute_sas_codelist_cas_serverslist_ml_projectslist_table_termslist_term_assetssubmit_batch_jobcatalog_run_agentcreate_ml_projectget_business_ruleget_castable_dataget_castable_infoget_decision_flowget_glossary_termlist_source_tablesupload_inline_datacatalog_list_agentslist_business_ruleslist_compute_tableslist_decision_flowslist_glossary_termsassign_glossary_termcreate_business_rulecreate_decision_flowcreate_glossary_termdelete_business_ruledelete_decision_flowdelete_glossary_termget_business_rulesetget_castable_columnslist_compute_columnsupdate_business_ruleupdate_decision_flowupdate_glossary_termcatalog_find_instancecatalog_search_helperimport_glossary_termslist_compute_contextspublish_decision_flowreset_compute_sessionsearch_glossary_termsget_compute_table_dataget_decision_flow_codeget_glossary_term_typelist_business_rulesetslist_compute_librarieslist_registered_modelsunassign_glossary_termcreate_business_rulesetdelete_business_rulesetpromote_table_to_memoryupdate_business_rulesetlist_glossary_term_typescatalog_get_agent_historycreate_glossary_term_typedelete_glossary_term_typepublish_ml_champion_modelupdate_glossary_term_typecatalog_get_adhoc_analysiscatalog_run_adhoc_analysisget_decision_flow_revisionregister_ml_champion_modellock_decision_flow_revisionlist_decision_flow_revisionslist_publishing_destinationscatalog_download_table_profilelock_business_ruleset_revisionlist_business_ruleset_revisions

AI-flagged — for review

Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.

  • info
    Tool "import_glossary_terms" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.