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io.github.sandraschi/resonite-mcp

io.github.sandraschi/resonite-mcp v1.2.0

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
Resources

Host io.github.sandraschi/resonite-mcp in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Reputation7stars0forks0open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard1 occurrence

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    web_sota/src/lib/api-base.ts:7

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard76 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    _llm_test_scripts/test_http_api.py:39_llm_test_scripts/test_http_api.py:41scripts/cua-smoke.py:162scripts/cua-smoke.py:388

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies41 of 800 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — RUSTSEC-2026-0190[email protected] — RUSTSEC-2026-0190[email protected] — RUSTSEC-2024-0413[email protected] — RUSTSEC-2024-0416

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (80)

send_oscplugin_infoplugin_listplugin_loadask_resonitehealth_checkplugin_reloadplugin_unloadsearch_guidestest_osc_echoosc_batch_sendcached_api_calldata_operationsplugin_discoversample_workflowstop_osc_serverlogged_operationstart_osc_serverosc_monitor_startresonite_link_getresonite_link_setget_latest_messageiterative_analysisosc_record_sessionresonite_vbot_headresonite_vbot_moveresonite_vbot_stopSota Avatar Base V4osc_analyze_trafficresonite_link_batchresonite_link_spawnresonite_vbot_spawnresonite_world_loadagentic_plan_executeget_osc_server_statsiterative_refinementoptimized_processingresonite_avatar_loadresonite_session_endcustom_business_logicget_received_messagesresonite_link_connectresonite_link_reflectProtoFlux Debugger Procollaborative_analysiscomprehensive_researchresonite_link_add_slotresonite_link_discoverresonite_link_get_noderesonite_link_get_slotresonite_parameter_setresonite_session_startsecure_data_operationsprotoflux_debug_sessionresonite_dashboard_cardresonite_inventory_cardresonite_inventory_inforesonite_inventory_listresonite_session_statusclear_osc_message_bufferprotoflux_analyze_scriptresonite_inventory_shareresonite_inventory_spawnresonite_link_read_fieldresonite_link_spawn_meshresonite_vbot_list_typesprotoflux_document_scriptprotoflux_optimize_scriptresonite_inventory_deleteresonite_inventory_searchresonite_inventory_uploadresonite_link_call_methodresonite_link_write_fieldresonite_link_destroy_slotresonite_link_get_childrenresonite_protoflux_executeprotoflux_generate_templateresonite_link_add_componentresonite_link_import_textureresonite_link_import_mesh_json