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io.github.reclaimprotocol/builder

io.github.reclaimprotocol/builder v0.1.46

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Host io.github.reclaimprotocol/builder in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Reputation1stars0forks3.2kdownloads/mo0open issues1d agolast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    In-Session Definition Integrityguardno call-gated or call-time tool definition changes

    Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard27 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    lib/cdp/capture-engine.js:22lib/cdp/capture-engine.js:82lib/cdp/container.js:319lib/mcp/api/to-zod.js:29

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard14 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    lib/cdp/container.js:332lib/cdp/container.js:386lib/cdp/container.js:410lib/cdp/launcher.js:279

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Published with provenanceno provenance attestation

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

    Fix: Publish with npm provenance (--provenance) from a trusted CI.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno install scripts

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • Pass
    Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • Pass
    Established maintainer12 maintainer(s)

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    No Token Passthroughguardno HTTP transport

    The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.

  • N/A
    DNS-Rebinding Protectionno HTTP transport

    HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (54)

navigatelist_tabsrun_proofget_cookiesget_requestget_sessioneval_in_pagehow_it_workssession_logsstop_captureupdate_draftlist_requestsreset_sessionstart_capturewait_for_pageattach_browsercheck_attestorcheck_matchersreplay_requestwait_for_logindispose_browserissue_org_tokencheck_app_statusget_me_providerspropose_providertest_user_scriptwait_for_sign_inget_devtools_modeget_provider_infoissue_credentialsissue_org_keypairresolve_owner_keyrun_proof_via_podset_devtools_modestart_integrationcreate_example_appimport_credentialsshare_browser_viewlink_app_to_accountwait_for_ai_sessionread_callback_eventsreclaim_authenticateissue_app_credentialsproxy_callback_eventssession_analytics_logsget_verification_resultfind_requests_containingupdate_provider_metadataverify_reclaim_sdk_setuplist_builder_organizationsanalyze_request_constraintsget_js_sdk_integration_guidescaffold_reclaim_demo_servercreate_provider_version_from_capture