Is mcp-console-automation safe to use?

mcp-console-automation scores 13/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 3 confirmed security failures that cap its score: No command-injection sinks, No dynamic code execution and No over-broad / destructive tools. It passes 13 of the 25 controls that apply to it.

What security issues does mcp-console-automation have?

mcp-console-automation fails 3 controls: No command-injection sinks, No dynamic code execution and No over-broad / destructive tools. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.

How reliable is the security score for mcp-console-automation?

We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to mcp-console-automation. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

Does mcp-console-automation have any security advisories?

mcp-console-automation has 1 non-scoring advisory — observations worth a human review that deliberately do not affect the deterministic score, since they can be noisy.

How was mcp-console-automation scored?

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

mcp-console-automation MCP Server Security Report

io.github.ooples/mcp-console-automation

MCP server for AI-driven console application automation and monitoring

13F

Security Trust Score

Grade F · Serious issues

Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest v1.0.2 Repository Publisher-verified

Declared MCP capabilities

Resources

Run it securely

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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3 issues capping this score

criticalNo command-injection sinks — 1 occurrence
criticalNo dynamic code execution — 4 occurrences
mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 2 over-broad tool(s)

The short answer

Is mcp-console-automation safe to use?: mcp-console-automation scores 13/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 3 confirmed security failures that cap its score: No command-injection sinks, No dynamic code execution and No over-broad / destructive tools. It passes 13 of the 25 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does mcp-console-automation have?: mcp-console-automation fails 3 controls: No command-injection sinks, No dynamic code execution and No over-broad / destructive tools. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for mcp-console-automation?: We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to mcp-console-automation. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
Does mcp-console-automation have any security advisories?: mcp-console-automation has 1 non-scoring advisory — observations worth a human review that deliberately do not affect the deterministic score, since they can be noisy.
How was mcp-console-automation scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Reputation44stars15forks180downloads/mo5open issues18d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version v1.0.2

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Fail
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard2 over-broad tool(s)
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?
Local Shell ProtocolAzure Cloud Shell Protocol
Fix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.
Warn
Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
Warn
Tool Definition Integrityguard1 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
console_get_stream
Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.
Pass
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

Application Security Checks

Fail
No command-injection sinksguard1 occurrence
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?
src/mcp/DirectReplacementMethod.ts:143
Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.
Fail
No dynamic code executionguard4 occurrences
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution. How many servers fail this?
src/core/DataPipelineManager.ts:422src/core/DataPipelineManager.ts:608src/core/DataPipelineManager.ts:619src/core/DataPipelineManager.ts:630
Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.
Warn
No path traversalguard8 occurrences
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
src/core/BaseProtocol.ts:87src/core/BaseProtocol.ts:103src/core/ErrorDetector.ts:518src/core/ErrorDetector.ts:526
Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
Warn
No SSRF sinksguard11 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
src/core/DataPipelineManager.ts:277src/core/DataPipelineManager.ts:698src/core/ErrorReporting.ts:544src/protocols/AzureProtocol.ts:686
Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
Warn
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).
Warn
Published with provenanceno provenance attestation
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
Fix: Publish with npm provenance (--provenance) from a trusted CI.
Warn
Has a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
Pass
No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Pass
No known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
Pass
No install/post-install scriptsguardno install scripts
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
Pass
Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
Pass
Established maintainer1 maintainer(s)
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Pass
Actively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Pass
Repository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Pass
Declares a licenseMIT
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Pass
Adoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.
Pass
Execution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
N/A
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
N/A
IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

AI-flagged — for review

Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.

info
Tool "console_get_stream" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

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Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
v1.0.2latest	13F	scored	10/5/2025
v1.0.1	62C	scored	10/3/2025

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.