io.github.ogasurfproject-jpg/hs-hearing v2.1.0
This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.
- criticalNo command-injection sinks — 1 occurrence
- criticalNo dynamic code execution — 1 occurrence
Security controls
Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controls
Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- WarnStrict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
- PassIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
- PassUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
- N/ATool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
Application Security Checks
- FailNo command-injection sinksguard1 occurrence
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
workers/hs-hearing/src/autopilot.js:348Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.
- FailNo dynamic code executionguard1 occurrence
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
paint-monitor/watch_madoreno_subsidy.py:167Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.
- WarnNo path traversalguard55 occurrences
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
hacker/sw.js:21kira-v4.js:259note-post/post_to_note.js:489note-post/post_to_note.js:489Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
- WarnNo SSRF sinksguard47 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
admin-app/sw.js:3generate_blog.py:109hacker/sw.js:23hacker/sw.js:31Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
- WarnNo known-vulnerable dependencies5 of 131 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
[email protected] — GHSA-6v7q-wjvx-w8wg[email protected] — GHSA-chqc-8p9q-pq6q[email protected] — GHSA-rp42-5vxx-qpwr[email protected] — GHSA-rpmf-866q-6p89Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
- WarnHas a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
- WarnAdoption & popularitylimited adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassCredentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- PassDependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassRepository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- PassDeclares a licenseMIT
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
- N/ANo install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- N/APackage name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- N/APublished with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- N/AEstablished maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Transport & Trust Model
- PassTransport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- PassIAM / Authentication ScopingOAuth / PRM handling detected
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- PassExecution Sandboxingcontainerized
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
- PassNetwork Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.