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io.github.obcraft/apiosk-mcp

io.github.obcraft/apiosk-mcp v1.7.0

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 99%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Host io.github.obcraft/apiosk-mcp in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Reputation0stars0forks282downloads/mo0open issues25d agolast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Tool Definition Integrityguard5 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

    apiosk_discoverapiosk_fetch_paidapiosk_list_walletsapiosk_search

    Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard22 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    server.mjs:52server.mjs:56server.mjs:69server.mjs:71

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard10 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    server.mjs:99src/hosted-payment.mjs:115src/hosted-payment.mjs:347src/hosted-wallets.mjs:123

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Published with provenanceno provenance attestation

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

    Fix: Publish with npm provenance (--provenance) from a trusted CI.

  • Warn
    Established maintainersingle maintainer

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

    Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.

  • Warn
    Declares a licenseno recognized license

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

    Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies2 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno install scripts

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • Pass
    Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    IAM / Authentication ScopingOAuth / PRM handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (41)

<name>Apioskapiosk_helpapiosk_healthapiosk_searchApiosk Connectapiosk_executeapiosk_exploreapiosk_get_apiapiosk_sign_inapiosk_discoverapiosk_metadataapiosk_configureapiosk_delete_apiapiosk_fetch_paidapiosk_update_apiapiosk_get_startedapiosk_publish_apiapiosk_wallet_listapiosk_inspect_x402apiosk_list_my_apisapiosk_list_walletsapiosk_create_walletapiosk_delete_walletapiosk_payment_guideapiosk_update_walletapiosk_wallet_createapiosk_wallet_deleteapiosk_wallet_selectapiosk_wallet_updateapiosk_create_accountApiosk paid API routesapiosk_wallet_save_secretapiosk_get_wallet_activityapiosk_show_wallet_fundingapiosk_list_wallet_api_keysapiosk_wallet_reveal_secretapiosk_create_wallet_api_keyapiosk_delete_wallet_api_keyapiosk_update_wallet_api_keyapiosk_create_wallet_connect_string

AI-flagged — for review

Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.

  • info
    Tool "apiosk_discover" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

  • info
    Tool "apiosk_fetch_paid" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

  • info
    Tool "apiosk_list_wallets" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

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