imap-mcp-server MCP Server Security Report
IMAP/SMTP MCP server to search, read, organize, send, reply & forward email for AI assistants
Run it securely
This server scored D. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.
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Claim this server- highNo risky post-publish tool changes (rug-pull) — 1 risky tool-definition change(s) in version history (1.5.0 → 1.5.2)
- mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 2 over-broad tool(s)
The short answer
- Is imap-mcp-server safe to use?
- imap-mcp-server scores 40/100 (grade D) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 2 confirmed security failures that cap its score: No risky post-publish tool changes (rug-pull) and No over-broad / destructive tools. It passes 16 of the 25 controls that apply to it.
- What security issues does imap-mcp-server have?
- imap-mcp-server fails 2 controls: No risky post-publish tool changes (rug-pull) and No over-broad / destructive tools. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
- How reliable is the security score for imap-mcp-server?
- We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to imap-mcp-server. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
- How was imap-mcp-server scored?
- Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Security controlslatest scored version v2.0.0
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controlslatest scored version v2.0.0
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- FailTool Definition Integrityguard1 risky tool-definition change(s) in version history (1.5.0 → 1.5.2)
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns. How many servers fail this?
imap_bulk_delete_by_searchFix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.
- FailUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard2 over-broad tool(s)
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?
imap_bulk_delete_by_searchimap_delete_by_domainFix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.
- WarnStrict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
- PassIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
Application Security Checks
- WarnNo SSRF sinksguard3 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
public/js/app.js:282public/js/app.js:418public/js/app.js:513Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
- WarnDependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).
- WarnEstablished maintainersingle maintainer
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.
- WarnHas a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
- PassNo command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
- PassNo dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
- PassNo path traversalguardno sinks found
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassCredentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- PassNo known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
- PassNo install/post-install scriptsguardno install scripts
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- PassPackage name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- PassPublished with provenancepublished with provenance
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassRepository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- PassDeclares a licenseMIT
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- PassAdoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnExecution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
- PassNetwork Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
- N/ATransport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- N/AIAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.
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[](https://index.canopii.dev/server/io.github.nikolausm/imap-mcp-server)<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/io.github.nikolausm/imap-mcp-server"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/io.github.nikolausm/imap-mcp-server" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>Versions
Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.