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io.github.maxschnee74-source/alpinelead

io.github.maxschnee74-source/alpinelead v7.9.4

Security Trust Score
Grade D · Weak posture
Tier 2 · Live endpointLow confidence · 28%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored D. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Tool Definition Integrityguard1 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

    discover_leads

    Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • Not checked
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno source files

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

Application Security Checks

  • Not checked
    No command-injection sinksguardno source

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Not checked
    No dynamic code executionguardno source

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Not checked
    No path traversalguardno source

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Not checked
    No SSRF sinksguardno source

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Not checked
    No unsafe deserializationguardno source

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Not checked
    No committed secretsguardno source

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Not checked
    Credentials sourced from environmentno source files

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Not checked
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no source files

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Not checked
    Actively maintainedno GitHub repository

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Not checked
    Repository not archivedguardno GitHub repository

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Declares a licenseno GitHub repository

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    Has a security policyno source files

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • Not checked
    Adoption & popularityno adoption signal

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • N/A
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno dependencies to scan

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Not checked
    Execution Sandboxingno source files

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Not checked
    Network Exposureno source files

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (83)

hunter_runnexus_joinradar_checkdiscover_leadsanalyze_companylearning_enginenexus_post_taskwinning_patternget_capabilitiesget_credit_packshunter_configurenexus_claim_tasknexus_find_tasksrun_sales_missionfind_opportunitiesgenerate_sales_kitget_credit_balanceget_hubspot_statusagent_purchase_taskagentpub_read_inboxnexus_a2a_discoverynexus_complete_taskrecommend_next_toolset_estimated_valuenexus_register_agentagentpub_join_channelagentpub_send_messagecheck_alpinelead_authfund_field_agent_tasknexus_discover_agentsnexus_get_task_resultnexus_guest_discoverynexus_trade_my_ordersagentpub_bridge_statusagentpub_leave_channelagentpub_list_channelscreate_credit_checkoutestimate_sales_missionpredictive_rhythm_infoagentpub_create_channelagentpub_set_own_statusnexus_trade_list_offerstest_hubspot_connectionagent_buyer_wallet_setupagentpub_invite_to_nexusget_sales_mission_resultnexus_trade_create_offernexus_trade_create_orderagent_buyer_wallet_statuscheck_field_agent_paymentdistribution_agent_statusfield_agent_payment_quotenexus_trade_deliver_orderpredictive_emergence_infocheck_sales_mission_statusnexus_trade_agent_passportget_alpinelead_auth_handoffmatch_alpinelead_capabilitynexus_trade_accept_deliverynexus_trade_create_checkoutnexus_trade_prepare_fundingpush_opportunity_to_hubspotagent_buyer_wallet_configurepredictive_access_tiers_infoagentpub_send_channel_messageget_field_agent_payment_quotenexus_trade_settlement_statusnexus_trade_capability_signalsagent_to_agent_payment_contractget_field_agent_registry_matrixrun_dach_company_research_agentdach_company_research_agent_infonexus_communication_monitor_infopredictive_motion_causality_infomanage_virtuals_field_agent_fleetnexus_trade_create_payment_intentnexus_trade_seller_connect_statusagentpub_inspect_discovery_schemasnexus_trade_seller_connect_onboardagentpub_inspect_remote_tool_schemaget_alpinelead_recommendation_packetagentpub_call_readonly_discovery_toollaunch_ready_field_agents_to_registries

AI-flagged — for review

Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.

  • info
    Tool "discover_leads" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.