Is apolo-cad safe to use?

apolo-cad scores 14/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 3 confirmed security failures that cap its score: No dynamic code execution, No unsafe deserialization and No over-broad / destructive tools. It passes 11 of the 24 controls that apply to it.

What security issues does apolo-cad have?

apolo-cad fails 3 controls: No dynamic code execution, No unsafe deserialization and No over-broad / destructive tools. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.

How reliable is the security score for apolo-cad?

We could evaluate 92% of the controls that apply to apolo-cad. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

How was apolo-cad scored?

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

apolo-cad MCP Server Security Report

io.github.mariorojasmz/apolo-cad

Agent-native parametric 3D CAD: model machines, validate them and emit shop drawings

14F

Security Trust Score

Grade F · Serious issues

Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 92%latest v0.1.0 Repository

Declared MCP capabilities

ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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3 issues capping this score

criticalNo dynamic code execution — 2 occurrences
highNo unsafe deserialization — 1 occurrence
mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 1 over-broad tool(s)

The short answer

Is apolo-cad safe to use?: apolo-cad scores 14/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 3 confirmed security failures that cap its score: No dynamic code execution, No unsafe deserialization and No over-broad / destructive tools. It passes 11 of the 24 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does apolo-cad have?: apolo-cad fails 3 controls: No dynamic code execution, No unsafe deserialization and No over-broad / destructive tools. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for apolo-cad?: We could evaluate 92% of the controls that apply to apolo-cad. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was apolo-cad scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Reputation2stars1forks0open issues2d agolast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version v0.1.0

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Fail
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard1 over-broad tool(s)
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?
run_command
Fix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.
Warn
Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
Pass
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
N/A
Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

Fail
No dynamic code executionguard2 occurrences
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution. How many servers fail this?
core/apolo/agent/script_wrapper.py:36core/apolo/library/loader.py:28
Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.
Fail
No unsafe deserializationguard1 occurrence
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code. How many servers fail this?
core/apolo/doc/geomcache.py:172
Fix: Use safe loaders (yaml.safe_load, JSON) on untrusted input.
Warn
No path traversalguard1 occurrence
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
ui/src/forms/SchemaForm.tsx:141
Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
Warn
No SSRF sinksguard17 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
ui/src/api.ts:53ui/src/api.ts:55ui/src/api.ts:57ui/src/api.ts:73
Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
Warn
Established maintainerrecently published
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.
Warn
Has a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
Warn
Adoption & popularitylimited adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.
Pass
No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Pass
No known-vulnerable dependencies12 runtime deps, no known CVEs
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
Pass
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Pass
Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
Pass
Actively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Pass
Repository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Pass
Declares a licenseMIT
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Not checked
No install/post-install scriptsguardnot determinable from PyPI metadata
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
Not checked
Published with provenancenot determinable
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
Pass
Network Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
N/A
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
N/A
IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
v0.1.0latest	14F	scored	8/8/2026

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.