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io.github.lonniev/excalibur-mcp

io.github.lonniev/excalibur-mcp v0.34.4

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
Resources

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

1 issue capping this score
  • highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 2 marker(s) across 2 tool(s)
Reputation3stars1forks0open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard2 marker(s) across 2 tool(s)

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

    excalibur_request_credential_channel — exfiltration directiveexcalibur_receive_credentials — exfiltration directive

    Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Stabilityguardno prior version to diff

    Tool definitions did not change after publish — no post-approval rug-pull.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard6 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    frontend/src/components/NpubGate.tsx:55frontend/src/components/NpubGate.tsx:56frontend/src/components/PostsPage.tsx:47frontend/src/lib/mcp.ts:27

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies16 of 334 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — GHSA-7432-952r-cw78[email protected] — GHSA-jj8c-mmj3-mmgv[email protected] — GHSA-m344-f55w-2m6j[email protected] — GHSA-r95x-qfjj-fjj2

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Declares a licenseno recognized license

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

    Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    IAM / Authentication ScopingOAuth / PRM handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (67)

excalibur_get_postexcalibur_get_voiceexcalibur_list_postsexcalibur_post_tweetexcalibur_save_voiceexcalibur_begin_oauthexcalibur_check_priceexcalibur_create_postexcalibur_delete_postexcalibur_get_snippetexcalibur_mint_couponexcalibur_update_postexcalibur_list_couponsexcalibur_oracle_aboutexcalibur_save_snippetexcalibur_check_balanceexcalibur_check_paymentexcalibur_delete_couponexcalibur_forget_couponexcalibur_get_x_profileexcalibur_list_snippetsexcalibur_redeem_couponexcalibur_update_couponexcalibur_delete_snippetexcalibur_service_statusexcalibur_session_statusexcalibur_adoption_statusexcalibur_list_my_couponsexcalibur_notarize_ledgerexcalibur_restore_creditsexcalibur_post_tweet_imageexcalibur_purchase_creditsexcalibur_request_adoptionexcalibur_account_statementexcalibur_get_nostr_profileexcalibur_get_pricing_modelexcalibur_get_scheduler_logexcalibur_set_pricing_modelexcalibur_check_oauth_statusexcalibur_check_proof_statusexcalibur_forget_credentialsexcalibur_list_notarizationsexcalibur_oracle_how_to_joinexcalibur_receive_npub_proofexcalibur_refine_post_regionexcalibur_request_npub_proofexcalibur_fetch_dynamic_blockexcalibur_oracle_get_tax_rateexcalibur_receive_credentialsexcalibur_reset_pricing_modelexcalibur_restore_neon_schemaexcalibur_oracle_lookup_memberexcalibur_list_constraint_typesexcalibur_publish_nostr_profileexcalibur_resolve_dynamic_blockexcalibur_get_notarization_proofexcalibur_check_authority_balanceexcalibur_oracle_network_advisoryexcalibur_process_scheduled_postsexcalibur_delete_patron_credentialexcalibur_update_patron_credentialexcalibur_list_canonical_identitiesexcalibur_request_credential_channelexcalibur_get_patron_credential_fieldsexcalibur_get_patron_onboarding_statusexcalibur_account_statement_infographicexcalibur_get_operator_onboarding_status
io.github.lonniev/excalibur-mcp v0.34.4 — 39/100 · Canopii Trust Index