Is sec-filing-analyzer safe to use?

sec-filing-analyzer scores 75/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 10 of the 22 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.

How reliable is the security score for sec-filing-analyzer?

We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to sec-filing-analyzer. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.

How was sec-filing-analyzer scored?

Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

sec-filing-analyzer MCP Server Security Report

io.github.kyliemckinleydemo/sec-filing-analyzer

AI-analyzed SEC filings: filings, analysis, screening, 30-day signals, track record.

75B

Security Trust Score

Grade B · Moderate posture

Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%latest v1.0.0 Repository

Declared MCP capabilities

ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

Host io.github.kyliemckinleydemo/sec-filing-analyzer in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Are you the maintainer?

Verify with GitHub to get alerted whenever kyliemckinleydemo/sec-filing-analyzer changes score — and claim the badge for your README.

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The short answer

Is sec-filing-analyzer safe to use?: sec-filing-analyzer scores 75/100 (grade B) on the Canopii Trust Index — good, minor gaps. It passes 10 of the 22 security controls that apply to it, with no confirmed security failures.
How reliable is the security score for sec-filing-analyzer?: We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to sec-filing-analyzer. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was sec-filing-analyzer scored?: Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.

Reputation1stars0forks0open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version v1.0.0

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

Warn
Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
Pass
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.
Pass
User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
N/A
Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

Warn
No command-injection sinksguard2 occurrences (build/test paths only)
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
scripts/complete-full-dataset.ts:178scripts/monitor-and-run-pipeline.ts:92
Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.
Warn
No path traversalguard14 occurrences
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
app/api/analyze/[accession]/route.ts:444app/api/companies/search/route.ts:73app/api/companies/search/route.ts:74app/api/query/route.ts:701
Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.
Warn
No SSRF sinksguard55 occurrences
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
app/alerts/page.tsx:193app/api/analyze/[accession]/route.ts:306app/api/cron/watchlist-alerts-scheduler/route.ts:57app/api/stock-prices/route.ts:239
Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.
Warn
No unsafe deserializationguard2 occurrences (build/test paths only)
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
scripts/predict_baseline.py:41scripts/predict_baseline.py:43
Fix: Use safe loaders (yaml.safe_load, JSON) on untrusted input.
Warn
No known-vulnerable dependencies10 of 369 runtime deps vulnerable; worst critical
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
[email protected] — GHSA-3pq3-5fj3-cg6v[email protected] — GHSA-44g4-m2mj-wpvx[email protected] — GHSA-4hqw-qxg8-jxx2[email protected] — GHSA-542g-h47m-68v8
Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.
Warn
Declares a licenseno recognized license
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).
Warn
Has a security policyno security policy
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.
Warn
Adoption & popularitylimited adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.
Pass
No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
Pass
No committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
Pass
Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
Pass
Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Pass
Actively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
Pass
Repository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
Not checked
Signed releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
N/A
No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
N/A
Package name not typosquattingguardno published package
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
N/A
Published with provenanceno published package
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
N/A
Established maintainerno published package
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

Warn
IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.
Warn
Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
Pass
Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
Pass
Network Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
N/A
Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
N/A
Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

Version	Score	Status	Published
v1.0.0latest	75B	scored	10/1/2026

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.