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io.github.iadnanmukhtar/hadithdb

io.github.iadnanmukhtar/hadithdb v0.2.0

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

1 issue capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 1 occurrence
Reputation6stars0forks2open issuestodaylast commit4yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard1 occurrence

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    bin/utils/import-tafsir-epub.js:144

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard81 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    app.js:263bin/buildSearchIndex.js:330bin/reviseHadith.js:152bin/utils/25794-grades.js:37

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard37 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    bin/buildSearchIndex.js:225bin/indexEnrichedHadithBatch.js:89bin/utils/build-hdith-malik-crosswalk.js:96bin/utils/hadithportal-scraper.js:935

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies4 of 440 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — GHSA-wfvx-fx73-3rfj[email protected] — GHSA-4mjr-xmp4-gh2g[email protected] — GHSA-x5fp-wj9c-mxmx[email protected] — GHSA-w5hq-g745-h8pq

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Declares a licenseno recognized license

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

    Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    IAM / Authentication ScopingOAuth / PRM handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (28)

The Qurالوَجِيزُترجمة روادترجمة الهلالي وخانتَذْكِيرُ القُرْآنِمَعَارِفُ القُرْآنِالكَشْفُ وَالبَيَانُالتَّفْسِيرُ اليَسِيرالمُحَرَّرُ الوَجِيزُترجمة صحيح إنترناشونالالتَّفْسِيرُ البَسِيطُالتَّفْسِيرُ الوَسِيطُالتَّفْسِيرُ المُحَرَّرُإِعْرَابُ القُرْآنِ الكَرِيمِاللُّبَابُ فِي عُلُومِ الكِتَابِالجَدْوَلُ فِي قِرَاءَاتِ القُرْآنِمَوْسُوعَةُ التَّفْسِيرِ المَأْثُورِزَادُ المَسِيرِ فِي عِلْمِ التَّفْسِيرِالسِّرَاجُ فِي بَيَانِ غَرِيبِ القُرْآنِنَفَحَاتٌ مِنْ تَفْسِيرِ القُرْآنِ الكَرِيمِجَامِعُ البَيَانِ عَنْ تَأْوِيلِ آيِ القُرْآنِالمُخْتَصَرُ فِي تَفْسِيرِ القُرْآنِ الكَرِيمِمَعَالِمُ التَّنْزِيلِ فِي تَفْسِيرِ القُرْآنِالدُّرُّ المَنْثُورُ فِي التَّفْسِيرِ بِالمَأْثُورِالجَدْوَلُ فِي إِعْرَابِ القُرْآنِ وَصَرْفِهِ وَبَيَانِهِتَيْسِيرُ الكَرِيمِ الرَّحْمَنِ فِي تَفْسِيرِ كَلَامِ المَنَّانِتَحْرِيرُ المَعْنَى السَّدِيدِ وَتَنْوِيرُ العَقْلِ الجَدِيدِ مِنْ تَفْسِيرِ الكِتَابِ المَجِيدِالجَامِعُ لِأَحْكَامِ القُرْآنِ وَالمُبَيِّنُ لِمَا تَضَمَّنَهُ مِنَ السُّنَّةِ وَآيِ الفُرْقَانِ