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remcp MCP Server Security Report

io.github.getremcp/remcp

Securely control paired computers with ReMCP.

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 96%latest v0.2.236 Repository
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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1 issue capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 1 occurrence

The short answer

Is remcp safe to use?
remcp scores 17/100 (grade F) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: No command-injection sinks. It passes 18 of the 26 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does remcp have?
remcp fails 1 control: No command-injection sinks. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for remcp?
We could evaluate 96% of the controls that apply to remcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
How was remcp scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation4stars1forks0open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controlslatest scored version v0.2.236

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    In-Session Definition Integrityguardno call-gated or call-time tool definition changes

    Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard1 occurrence

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    packages/runtime/src/tools/darwin-memory-pressure.mjs:7

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard63 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    packages/client/src/agent-update.mjs:36packages/client/src/agent-update.mjs:41packages/client/src/cli.mjs:35packages/client/src/cli.mjs:37

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard5 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    packages/client/src/cli.mjs:27packages/client/src/cli.mjs:98packages/client/src/cli/connect.mjs:49packages/client/src/cli/connect.mjs:56

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies33 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    IAM / Authentication ScopingOAuth / PRM handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • Pass
    No Token Passthroughguardno inbound token forwarded downstream

    The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.

  • Not checked
    DNS-Rebinding ProtectionHTTP transport not found in source

    HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
v0.2.236latest17Fscored
v0.2.23217Fscored
v0.2.22717Fscored
v0.2.21217Fscored
v0.2.19817Fscored
v0.2.19492Ascored
v0.2.19093Ascored
v0.2.18793Ascored
v0.2.18193Ascored
v0.2.17689Bscored
v0.2.17593Ascored
v0.2.17193Ascored
v0.2.17093Ascored
v0.2.16993Ascored
v0.2.16593Ascored
v0.2.15393Ascored
v0.2.14992Ascored
v0.2.14690Ascored
v0.2.14390Ascored
v0.2.14190Ascored
v0.2.12390Ascored
v0.2.12290Ascored
v0.2.11690Ascored
v0.2.11590Ascored
v0.2.11390Ascored
v0.2.10689Bscored

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.