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io.github.fmadore/iwac-mcp-server

io.github.fmadore/iwac-mcp-server v1.1.0

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

1 issue capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 3 occurrences
Reputation1stars1forks3open issues21d agolast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Warn
    Tool Definition Integrityguard5 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

    search_articlesget_articlesearch_by_sentimentget_sentiment_distribution

    Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard3 occurrences

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    mcpb/scripts/duckdb-bindings.mjs:76mcpb/scripts/pack-platforms.mjs:107mcpb/scripts/pack-platforms.mjs:108

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard5 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    mcpb/scripts/duckdb-bindings.mjs:20mcpb/smoke-test.mjs:104mcpb/src/app/views/topics.ts:64mcpb/src/app/views/topics.ts:64

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard2 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    mcpb/src/hf.ts:18mcpb/src/hf.ts:28

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies58 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    IAM / Authentication ScopingOAuth / PRM handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (34)

fetchsearchget_imageget_articleget_documentsearch_indexget_referencesearch_imagesget_audiovisualget_index_entrysearch_articlesget_cooccurrenceget_semantic_maplist_audiovisuallist_periodicalssearch_documentsget_similar_itemssearch_referencessearch_audiovisualget_lexical_metricsget_newspaper_statssearch_by_sentimentsearch_publicationsget_collection_statsget_country_comparisonget_field_distributionget_place_distributionget_topic_distributionsemantic_search_imagesget_publication_fulltextsemantic_search_articlesget_temporal_distributionget_sentiment_distributionsemantic_search_publications

AI-flagged — for review

Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.

  • info
    Tool "search_articles" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

  • info
    Tool "get_article" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

  • info
    Tool "search_by_sentiment" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

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