CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →
io.github.eren23/attocode-code-intel

io.github.eren23/attocode-code-intel v0.1.24

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 78%
Declared MCP capabilities
ToolsResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

3 issues capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 3 occurrences
  • criticalNo dynamic code execution — 10 occurrences
  • highNo unsafe deserialization — 3 occurrences
Reputation17stars1forks1open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    In-Session Definition Integrityguardno call-gated or call-time tool definition changes

    Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.

  • Not checked
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno tools extracted

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Not checked
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementno tool schemas found

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Not checked
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno tools extracted

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard3 occurrences

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    eval/rule_accuracy/corpus/python/CWE-78/tp_command_injection.py:8eval/rule_accuracy/corpus/python/CWE-78/tp_command_injection.py:11eval/rule_accuracy/corpus/python/CWE-78/tp_command_injection.py:14

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Fail
    No dynamic code executionguard10 occurrences

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution. How many servers fail this?

    eval/quality/file_symbol_probe.py:35eval/quality/importance_probe.py:97eval/rule_accuracy/corpus/javascript/CWE-95/tp_code_injection.js:5eval/rule_accuracy/corpus/javascript/CWE-95/tp_code_injection.js:9

    Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.

  • Fail
    No unsafe deserializationguard3 occurrences

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code. How many servers fail this?

    eval/rule_accuracy/corpus/python/CWE-502/tp_unsafe_deser.py:9eval/rule_accuracy/corpus/python/CWE-502/tp_unsafe_deser.py:12eval/rule_accuracy/corpus/python/CWE-502/tp_unsafe_deser.py:15

    Fix: Use safe loaders (yaml.safe_load, JSON) on untrusted input.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard5 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    eval/meta_harness/experiment_20repos.py:48frontend/src/components/layout/Sidebar.tsx:148frontend/src/components/layout/Sidebar.tsx:158frontend/src/components/layout/Sidebar.tsx:173

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard10 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    eval/matrix/datasets.py:316eval/quality/cloud.py:68eval/quality/cloud.py:213eval/rule_accuracy/corpus/typescript/performance/tn_safe_async.ts:5

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies2 of 160 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — GHSA-f23m-r3pf-42rh[email protected] — GHSA-r5fr-rjxr-66jc[email protected] — GHSA-2j2x-hqr9-3h42[email protected] — GHSA-337j-9hxr-rhxg

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Established maintainerrecently published

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

    Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    No install/post-install scriptsguardnot determinable from PyPI metadata

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • Not checked
    Published with provenancenot determinable

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    No Token Passthroughguardno HTTP transport

    The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.

  • N/A
    DNS-Rebinding Protectionno HTTP transport

    HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.