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io.github.dzenlotus/worklife-agent

io.github.dzenlotus/worklife-agent v0.5.2

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
Prompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

1 issue capping this score
  • highNo unsafe deserialization — 2 occurrences
Reputation3stars0forks0open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No unsafe deserializationguard2 occurrences

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code. How many servers fail this?

    src/worklife/agent_install.py:213src/worklife/agent_install.py:355

    Fix: Use safe loaders (yaml.safe_load, JSON) on untrusted input.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard3 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    frontend/scripts/verify-build.mjs:29frontend/src/model.js:220frontend/src/model.js:247

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard3 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    frontend/src/App.jsx:128frontend/src/App.jsx:827scripts/verify_local_docker_network.py:175

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 of 178 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — GHSA-82w8-qh3p-5jfq[email protected] — GHSA-86qp-5c8j-p5mr[email protected] — GHSA-jp82-jpqv-5vv3[email protected] — GHSA-wqp7-x3pw-xc5r

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Declares a licenseno recognized license

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

    Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (80)

cv_matchjob_savetask_addcv_createcv_exportpeer_syncinbox_syncjob_assessoffer_saveagent_briefjobs_searchaction_draftagency_briefauthor_trustbrowser_openprofile_saverecords_listschedule_runaction_cancelbackup_createmarket_reportoffer_comparepeer_registerresearch_noteresource_saveresume_importschedule_savesearch_reviewtask_completeaction_approveaction_executeautomation_runconnector_reademployer_blockinterview_savemarket_collectactivity_recordblockchain_mineblockchain_syncbrowser_inspectbrowser_prepareconnectors_listinterview_briefknowledge_querymarket_snapshotpipeline_updaterecruiter_skillrecruiter_startschedule_toggleaction_reconcileknowledge_exportknowledge_importknowledge_verifyautomation_statusblockchain_blocksblockchain_importblockchain_statusconversation_listcredential_createexperiment_assignexperiment_createexperiment_reportknowledge_publishstatistics_reportapplication_updateblockchain_connectblockchain_qualifybrowser_screenshotexperiment_outcomeconnector_configureconversation_recordconversation_updateknowledge_proposalsrecommendation_saveautomation_configureblockchain_challengerecommendations_reportbrowser_fill_credentialblockchain_telegram_connectblockchain_telegram_create_group