CanopiiCanopiiAll serversEnterprise →
io.github.discourse/mcp

io.github.discourse/mcp v0.3.1

Security Trust Score
Grade D · Weak posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
Prompts

This server scored D. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

1 issue capping this score
  • highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
Reputation72stars40forks10.0kdownloads/mo3open issues3d agolast commit1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?

    discourse_ai_update_custom_tool — exfiltration directive

    Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno install scripts

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • Pass
    Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • Pass
    Published with provenancepublished with provenance

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • Pass
    Established maintainer8 maintainer(s)

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (80)

ToolAgentBlankalicequerySearchdiscourse_get_userdiscourse_get_draftdiscourse_get_groupdiscourse_get_querydiscourse_get_themediscourse_get_reportdiscourse_save_draftdiscourse_create_postdiscourse_create_userdiscourse_get_webhookdiscourse_list_groupsdiscourse_ai_get_agentdiscourse_create_groupdiscourse_create_querydiscourse_create_themediscourse_create_topicdiscourse_delete_draftdiscourse_delete_groupdiscourse_delete_querydiscourse_delete_themediscourse_get_workflowdiscourse_list_reportsdiscourse_update_groupdiscourse_install_themediscourse_ai_list_agentsdiscourse_create_webhookdiscourse_delete_webhookdiscourse_get_reviewablediscourse_ai_create_agentdiscourse_ai_delete_agentdiscourse_ai_export_agentdiscourse_ai_import_agentdiscourse_ai_update_agentdiscourse_create_categorydiscourse_create_workflowdiscourse_delete_workflowdiscourse_list_categoriesdiscourse_ai_list_featuresdiscourse_get_post_repliesdiscourse_get_user_summarydiscourse_list_group_postsdiscourse_list_reviewablesdiscourse_get_chat_messagesdiscourse_get_post_revisiondiscourse_list_latest_postsdiscourse_ai_get_custom_tooldiscourse_list_site_settingsdiscourse_ai_test_custom_tooldiscourse_ai_create_agent_userdiscourse_ai_get_topic_summarydiscourse_ai_list_custom_toolsdiscourse_get_topic_view_statsdiscourse_list_directory_itemsdiscourse_ai_create_custom_tooldiscourse_ai_delete_custom_tooldiscourse_ai_export_custom_tooldiscourse_ai_get_feature_configdiscourse_ai_import_custom_tooldiscourse_ai_update_custom_tooldiscourse_get_support_dashboarddiscourse_create_private_messagediscourse_discard_workflow_draftdiscourse_get_review_queue_countdiscourse_get_workflow_executiondiscourse_list_reviewable_topicsdiscourse_ai_list_sentiment_postsdiscourse_ai_get_custom_tool_guidediscourse_ai_update_feature_configdiscourse_list_workflow_executionsdiscourse_list_workflow_node_typesdiscourse_invite_to_private_messagediscourse_list_workflow_credentialsdiscourse_get_user_moderation_summarydiscourse_evaluate_workflow_expression