whoop-mcp MCP Server Security Report
Privacy-first, unofficial WHOOP MCP server for AI health, sleep, recovery, and performance agents.
Run it securely
This server scored D. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.
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Claim this server- highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
The short answer
- Is whoop-mcp safe to use?
- whoop-mcp scores 41/100 (grade D) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: Tool descriptions free of injection markers. It passes 17 of the 25 controls that apply to it.
- What security issues does whoop-mcp have?
- whoop-mcp fails 1 control: Tool descriptions free of injection markers. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
- How reliable is the security score for whoop-mcp?
- We could evaluate 98% of the controls that apply to whoop-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
- Does whoop-mcp have any security advisories?
- whoop-mcp has 2 non-scoring advisories — observations worth a human review that deliberately do not affect the deterministic score, since they can be noisy.
- How was whoop-mcp scored?
- Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Security controlslatest scored version v0.5.3
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Security controlslatest scored version v0.5.3
Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.
Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails
- FailIndirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?
whoop_privacy_audit — exfiltration directiveFix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.
- WarnStrict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict
Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.
Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.
- WarnTool Definition Integrityguard2 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)
Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.
whoop_exchange_codewhoop_revoke_accessFix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.
- PassUser-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope
No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.
Application Security Checks
- WarnDependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found
A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.
Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).
- WarnPublished with provenanceno provenance attestation
Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.
Fix: Publish with npm provenance (--provenance) from a trusted CI.
- WarnEstablished maintainersingle maintainer
Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.
Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.
- PassNo command-injection sinksguardno sinks found
Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.
- PassNo dynamic code executionguardno sinks found
eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.
- PassNo path traversalguardno sinks found
Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).
- PassNo SSRF sinksguardno sinks found
Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.
- PassNo unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found
pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.
- PassNo committed secretsguardno secrets found
Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.
- PassCredentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment
Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.
- PassNo known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs
Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.
- PassNo install/post-install scriptsguardno install scripts
install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.
- PassPackage name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name
Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.
- PassActively maintainedrecent commits
Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.
- PassRepository not archivedguardactive
Archived repositories will never be patched.
- PassDeclares a licenseMIT
A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.
- PassHas a security policySECURITY.md present
A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.
- PassAdoption & popularityestablished adoption
A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.
- Not checkedSigned releasesnot evaluated
Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.
Transport & Trust Model
- WarnExecution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)
A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.
Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.
- PassNetwork Exposureno bind-all detected
Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.
- N/ATransport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints
Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.
- N/AIAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints
OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.
- N/ALive Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned
A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.
- N/AAuthentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned
If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.
AI-flagged — for review
Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.
- infoTool "whoop_exchange_code" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.
- infoTool "whoop_revoke_access" description changed after publish
Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.
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[](https://index.canopii.dev/server/io.github.davidmosiah/whoop-mcp)<a href="https://index.canopii.dev/server/io.github.davidmosiah/whoop-mcp"><img src="https://index.canopii.dev/api/badge/io.github.davidmosiah/whoop-mcp" alt="Canopii Trust Score" /></a>Versions
Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.