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bostrom-mcp MCP Server Security Report

io.github.cyberia-to/bostrom-mcp

86-tool MCP server for Bostrom blockchain: read chain state and sign transactions

Security Trust Score
Grade D · Weak posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 91%latest v0.5.0 Repository Publisher-verified
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it securely

This server scored D. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

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1 issue capping this score
  • highTool descriptions free of injection markers1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)

The short answer

Is bostrom-mcp safe to use?
bostrom-mcp scores 40/100 (grade D) on the Canopii Trust Index, and carries 1 confirmed security failure that caps its score: Tool descriptions free of injection markers. It passes 13 of the 25 controls that apply to it.
What security issues does bostrom-mcp have?
bostrom-mcp fails 1 control: Tool descriptions free of injection markers. Each failure on this page carries the evidence behind it — the file and line, dependency, or CVE that decided it.
How reliable is the security score for bostrom-mcp?
We could evaluate 91% of the controls that apply to bostrom-mcp. Scores are deterministic — the same source always produces the same score — and a partially-scannable server cannot present a high one, because confidence caps the result. The scanner is open source, so this score can be reproduced independently.
Does bostrom-mcp have any security advisories?
bostrom-mcp has 6 non-scoring advisories — observations worth a human review that deliberately do not affect the deterministic score, since they can be noisy.
How was bostrom-mcp scored?
Its published source was scanned against a fixed catalog of weighted security controls covering code safety, committed secrets, dependency vulnerabilities, tool-description integrity, authentication and transport, and maintenance. A confirmed flaw caps the score outright regardless of what else passes. The full rubric is published.
Reputation244downloads/mo

Security controlslatest scored version v0.5.0

Each control is evaluated deterministically with evidence. The score is earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?

    wallet_send — exfiltration directive

    Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Warn
    Tool Definition Integrityguard6 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

    li_submit_proofli_mine_stateli_mine_configli_emission

    Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Published with provenanceno provenance attestation

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

    Fix: Publish with npm provenance (--provenance) from a trusted CI.

  • Warn
    Established maintainersingle maintainer

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

    Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno install scripts

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • Pass
    Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Actively maintainedGitHub API unavailable

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Not checked
    Repository not archivedguardGitHub API unavailable

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Declares a licenseGitHub API unavailable

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

AI-flagged — for review

Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.

  • info
    Tool "li_submit_proof" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

  • info
    Tool "li_mine_state" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

  • info
    Tool "li_mine_config" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

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Versions

VersionScoreStatus
v0.5.0latest40Dscored
v0.2.091Ascored
v0.1.1no repository

Wondering how this compares? The MCP Security Index tracks grade distribution, committed secrets, and missing authentication across the whole ecosystem, refreshed monthly.