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io.github.browtastic/freellms-gateway

io.github.browtastic/freellms-gateway v1.0.1

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 88%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

3 issues capping this score
  • criticalNo dynamic code execution — 5 occurrences
  • highNo unsafe deserialization — 3 occurrences
  • mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 1 over-broad tool(s)
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Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard1 over-broad tool(s)

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?

    run_command

    Fix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    In-Session Definition Integrityguardno call-gated or call-time tool definition changes

    Tool and prompt definitions stay fixed during a session — they don't change after a few calls, which is how runtime-gated rug-pulls slip past one-time review.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No dynamic code executionguard5 occurrences

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution. How many servers fail this?

    devtools/devtools_server.js:309devtools/devtools_server.js:407devtools/devtools_server.ts:303devtools/devtools_server.ts:412

    Fix: Remove eval/exec; parse and dispatch explicitly.

  • Fail
    No unsafe deserializationguard3 occurrences

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code. How many servers fail this?

    mcp_servers/agent_state_api.py:26mcp_servers/agent_state_api.py:32mcp_servers/database_api.py:144

    Fix: Use safe loaders (yaml.safe_load, JSON) on untrusted input.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard7 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    bridge/bridge.js:125devtools/devtools_server.js:73devtools/devtools_server.js:269devtools/devtools_server.ts:50

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard12 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    bridge/bridge.js:85bridge/bridge.js:99bridge/bridge.js:111devtools/devtools_server.js:491

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Declares a licenseno recognized license

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

    Fix: Add a recognized SPDX license (MIT, Apache-2.0, …).

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    No Token Passthroughguardno inbound token forwarded downstream

    The client's token is never forwarded to downstream APIs — the server obtains its own, correctly-scoped credential instead.

  • Not checked
    DNS-Rebinding ProtectionHTTP transport not found in source

    HTTP endpoints reject requests carrying an unlisted Origin, so a malicious web page can't drive the server through the user's browser.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (23)

list_filesopen_remoterun_commandaccess_filesmerge_configagent_executefetch_webhookquery_walletsread_templatereport_findingsecurity_auditset_cli_configadb_devices_cmdeval_expressionreplay_cli_argsopen_remote_saferun_profile_fixedfetch_npm_metadataportfolio_analysisquery_transactionsinstall_custom_noderun_terminal_profilefetch_webhook_allowlisted