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io.github.barneywohl/hugging-bay

io.github.barneywohl/hugging-bay v0.1.2

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 92% Dynamically scanned
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Host io.github.barneywohl/hugging-bay in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Reputation591downloads/mo

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard2 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    index.mjs:1387index.mjs:1407

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Published with provenanceno provenance attestation

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

    Fix: Publish with npm provenance (--provenance) from a trusted CI.

  • Warn
    Established maintainersingle maintainer

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

    Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno install scripts

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • Pass
    Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Actively maintainedGitHub API unavailable

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Not checked
    Repository not archivedguardGitHub API unavailable

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Not checked
    Declares a licenseGitHub API unavailable

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (80)

get_stackget_topicget_healthlist_filesget_rankingget_trafficlist_stackslist_topicsget_artifactget_trendinglist_mirrorspreview_fileget_local_kitreport_reviewupdate_mirrorget_import_runrequest_mirrorget_agent_tasksget_answer_packget_mirror_packlist_publishersregister_mirrorget_review_queueget_trust_bundlelist_import_runsresolve_artifactsearch_artifactscompare_artifactsget_artifact_cardget_citation_packget_download_planget_import_statuslist_answer_packslist_mirror_packssave_saved_searchget_peer_fallbacksget_release_bundlelist_indexing_urlslist_mirror_demanddelete_saved_searchget_agent_discoveryget_artifact_bundleget_indexing_statusget_recommendationsget_source_coveragelist_saved_searchesmark_review_helpfulrecommend_artifactsget_ai_bot_allowlistget_artifact_reviewsget_catalog_coverageget_evidence_rollupsget_mirror_readinessget_artifact_insightsget_artifact_metadataget_community_signalsget_mirror_scale_planget_open_source_radarget_publisher_profileget_release_readinessget_ai_mention_monitorget_ai_mention_resultsget_ai_search_guidanceget_publisher_workflowsubmit_artifact_reviewget_publisher_dashboardget_saved_search_digestlist_downloadable_fileslist_publisher_api_keysrequest_source_indexingcreate_publisher_api_keyget_manifest_signing_keylist_saved_search_alertsrevoke_publisher_api_keyget_artifact_distributionget_source_request_statuslist_admin_peer_fallbacksapply_publisher_applicationget_publisher_release_templateget_publisher_application_status