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io.github.aeoess/agent-passport-mcp

io.github.aeoess/agent-passport-mcp v4.0.0

Security Trust Score
Grade C · Needs review
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 99%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Run it through Canopii Gateway — policy enforcement, audit trail, and per-user attribution on every call.

1 issue capping this score
  • mediumNo install/post-install scriptsruns postinstall
Reputation1stars4forks1.5kdownloads/mo0open issues27d agolast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Warn
    Tool Definition Integrityguard12 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

    list_tools_for_scopeaccept_assignmentverify_delegationcommerce_preflight

    Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No install/post-install scriptsguardruns postinstall

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time. How many servers fail this?

    Fix: Remove preinstall/install/postinstall scripts, or document and minimize them.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Published with provenanceno provenance attestation

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

    Fix: Publish with npm provenance (--provenance) from a trusted CI.

  • Warn
    Established maintainersingle maintainer

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

    Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseApache-2.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (150)

identifybroadcastcheck_tierget_digestlist_tasksrotate_keyget_my_rolelist_agentsassign_agentget_evidencesend_messagesign_chartersub_delegatecomplete_taskcreate_intentendorse_agentgateway_statsgenerate_keysis_key_activelist_profilesrequest_introverify_issuercheck_messagescreate_chartercreate_gatewaygovernance_360issue_passportsearch_matchesverify_aps_txtverify_charterattest_to_floorcomplete_actionevaluate_intentgateway_approveget_task_detailresolve_lineagereview_evidencesubmit_evidencecreate_principalgenerate_aps_txtget_agora_threadget_agora_topicsget_fleet_statushandoff_evidencerespond_to_introreview_promotionvouch_reputationaccept_assignmentcreate_delegationcreate_disclosurecreate_task_brieffile_data_disputeis_evidence_freshload_values_floorresolve_authorityrevoke_delegationupdate_reputationverify_delegationactivate_emergencycommerce_preflightcompare_timestampscompute_action_refevaluate_thresholdget_agora_by_topicget_commerce_spendget_passport_gradepost_agora_messageremove_intent_cardresolve_path_termsrevoke_endorsementsubmit_deliverableverify_endorsementgenerate_settlementquery_contributionsadd_principal_reportaps_verify_promotioncreate_agent_contextcreate_v2_delegationdetect_purpose_driftexecute_with_contextlist_tools_for_scoperegister_agora_agentregister_data_sourceaps_promote_statementaps_verify_settlementcheck_usage_permittedcreate_access_receiptcreate_outcome_recordcreate_policy_contextget_promotion_historylist_issuance_recordsregister_agora_publicverify_rotation_chainadd_approval_signatureaps_create_provisionalcreate_access_snapshotmutualAuthVerifyAttestrequest_human_approvalaps_project_attributioncheck_purpose_permittedcheck_retention_expiredcreate_approval_requestcreate_hybrid_timestampget_behavioral_sequencemutualAuthDeriveSessionsupersede_v2_delegationverify_governance_blockaps_aggregate_settlementaps_withdraw_provisionalcompute_governance_taintdefine_emergency_pathwayvalidate_temporal_rightsclassify_evidence_qualitycreate_derivation_receiptgateway_process_tool_callgenerate_governance_blockapply_reputation_downgradeaps_attribution_receipt_idaps_capability_sign_effectcreate_artifact_provenancecreate_reserve_attestationevaluate_revocation_impactmutualAuthBuildCertificateresolve_rights_propagationaps_build_contributor_queryaps_capability_mint_receiptcheck_aggregate_constraintscheck_combination_permittedcheck_jurisdiction_transfermutualAuthVerifyTrustBundleparse_governance_block_htmlaps_check_artifact_citationsaps_sign_attribution_consentcreate_data_enforcement_gateaps_check_escalation_requiredaps_compute_data_axis_weightsaps_record_owner_confirmationdeclare_reidentification_riskaps_capability_issue_challengeaps_create_attribution_receiptaps_verify_attribution_consentcreate_chained_governance_blockcreate_decision_lineage_receiptaps_check_projection_consistencyaps_compute_compute_axis_weightsaps_verify_attribution_primitiveaps_capability_evaluate_authorityaps_verify_attribution_projectionaps_compute_attribution_action_refaps_construct_attribution_primitive

AI-flagged — for review

Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.

  • info
    Tool "list_tools_for_scope" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

  • info
    Tool "accept_assignment" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

  • info
    Tool "verify_delegation" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

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