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io.github.UnityNodes/canton-ccpedia

io.github.UnityNodes/canton-ccpedia v1.0.1

Security Trust Score
Grade B · Moderate posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

Host io.github.UnityNodes/canton-ccpedia in a governed environment — SSO in front, every tool call attributed and audited.

Reputation0stars0forks0open issues37d agolast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Warn
    Tool Definition Integrityguard44 tool description(s) drifted after publish (no risk signals in diff)

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

    searchget_ciplist_cipsget_discussion

    Fix: Never add hidden directives or destructive scope to an already-published tool; document description changes in release notes.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    Credentials sourced from environmentno env-based config detected

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

    Fix: Read credentials from environment variables or a secret manager.

  • Warn
    No known-vulnerable dependencies5 of 309 runtime deps vulnerable; worst high

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

    [email protected] — GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm[email protected] — GHSA-pm4m-ph32-ghv5[email protected] — GHSA-28wg-ghj8-5hjv[email protected] — GHSA-2v37-7h3g-55p8

    Fix: Upgrade the flagged dependencies past their fixed versions.

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)lockfile present

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseApache-2.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (88)

searchget_cipget_docget_faqget_radarget_videolist_cipslist_reposfind_expertlist_videosdetect_driftfull_contextget_kb_driftget_trendingsearch_talksget_cip_votesget_proposalsget_validatorlearning_pathcompare_to_evmdiagnose_errorget_discussionget_whitepapermigrate_lookupcall_canton_mcpget_app_metricsget_cip_historyget_sv_schedulesemantic_searchget_cip_mentionsget_issue_statusget_npm_packagesget_token_marketlist_canton_mcpslist_votes_by_svlist_whitepaperssearch_communitycheck_deprecationfind_known_issuesget_api_referenceget_cip_citationsget_network_stateget_network_statsget_sdk_changelogget_started_guidelist_deprecationsfind_code_examplesget_ecosystem_gapsget_latest_releaseget_mailing_threadget_recent_changesget_upgrade_statuslist_featured_appscommunity_consensusget_cip_attachmentsget_foundation_infoget_governance_voteget_validator_fleetsearch_mailing_listfind_apps_by_patternfind_cip_for_featureget_breaking_changesget_cip_vote_outcomeget_current_versionslist_mailing_threadssearch_github_issuessearch_release_notesfind_security_patchesfind_similar_projectsget_funding_landscapeget_github_discussionlist_governance_votesdetect_builder_overlapget_recent_deploymentsget_upcoming_deadlinesget_proposal_milestonesget_upcoming_operationslist_ecosystem_projectslist_github_discussionsfind_maintainer_guidanceecosystem_dependency_graphoutdated_guidance_detectorproposal_success_predictorcompare_governance_outcomesdetect_cip_dependency_chainget_cip_implementation_statusget_recurring_issue_fingerprintfind_collaboration_opportunities

AI-flagged — for review

Observations from an AI review of tool descriptions. These are advisory only and do not affect the score — they can be noisy and need human judgement.

  • info
    Tool "search" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

  • info
    Tool "get_cip" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

  • info
    Tool "list_cips" description changed after publish

    Benign definition drift: the description changed vs the prior version with no risk signals in the diff. Clients approve tools by name and don't re-review on update, so the change is invisible to existing grants.

Show 5 more
io.github.UnityNodes/canton-ccpedia v1.0.1 — 86/100 · Canopii Trust Index