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io.github.Typeroll/typeroll

io.github.Typeroll/typeroll v0.45.105

Security Trust Score
Grade D · Weak posture
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored D. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

1 issue capping this score
  • highTool descriptions free of injection markers — 1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)
Reputation0stars0forks9.6kdownloads/mo1open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguard1 marker(s) across 1 tool(s)

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent. How many servers fail this?

    read_app_documentation — exfiltration directive

    Fix: Remove hidden directives, HTML/comment instructions, and override phrasing from descriptions.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Established maintainersingle maintainer

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

    Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No command-injection sinksguardno sinks found

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No path traversalguardno sinks found

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno install scripts

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • Pass
    Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • Pass
    Published with provenancepublished with provenance

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Warn
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno authentication handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

    Fix: Implement OAuth 2.1 with a .well-known/oauth-protected-resource document.

  • Warn
    Execution Sandboxingruns natively (no container image)

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

    Fix: Ship a Dockerfile/Containerfile (or document a sandboxed run) so the server runs isolated.

  • Warn
    Network Exposurebinds 0.0.0.0

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

    Fix: Bind to 127.0.0.1 by default; never ship open debug endpoints.

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (80)

read_applist_appsshare_siteupdate_appread_domainlist_deployslist_api_keysrevoke_api_keytrigger_deployread_block_typelist_block_typeslist_site_sharesbulk_replace_textcreate_block_typedelete_block_typeget_deploy_statuspage_completenessread_content_typerevoke_site_shareupdate_block_typeupdate_site_shareexport_block_typesimport_block_typeslist_content_typespreview_block_typesave_hosting_groupcreate_content_typedelete_content_typelist_hosting_groupsupdate_content_typevalidate_block_typecheck_internal_linksconnect_hosting_groupget_publication_impactread_app_documentationset_publishing_domainsset_site_hosting_groupread_publishing_domainsread_site_hosting_groupset_organization_ai_keychange_page_content_typelist_block_type_starterscancel_organization_buildlist_organization_invitesread_publishing_readinessretry_deploy_verificationcreate_organization_invitelist_organization_api_keysremove_organization_ai_keyrevoke_organization_inviteset_organization_analyticsfind_pages_using_block_typelist_organization_analyticsrevoke_organization_api_keycheck_managed_site_migrationread_organization_ai_settingsguide_publishing_domain_changeonboard_publishing_domain_zoneread_organization_build_enginesave_organization_media_accesscheck_organization_build_accessconnect_organization_cloudflaremigrate_managed_site_publishingset_organization_ai_site_accesssetup_organization_build_engineprepare_publishing_domain_changeapprove_publishing_domain_cutoverread_organization_media_migrationprepare_organization_media_storageretry_organization_media_migrationselect_organization_build_providerset_organization_publishing_domainslist_organization_publishing_domainsread_organization_publishing_domainscheck_organization_github_permissionsdiagnose_organization_github_connectionread_organization_publishing_connectionsconfigure_organization_publishing_domainsdiagnose_organization_cloudflare_connectiondisconnect_organization_publishing_provider