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io.github.SeanHogg/builderforce

io.github.SeanHogg/builderforce v1.0.0

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 90%
Declared MCP capabilities
Resources

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

1 issue capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 11 occurrences
Reputation5stars1forks0open issuestodaylast commit<1yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Strict JSON Schema EnforcementadditionalProperties:false present

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

  • Pass
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguardno destructive tool scope

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval.

  • N/A
    Tool Definition Integrityguardno prior version to diff

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard11 occurrences

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    agent-runtime/extensions/bluebubbles/src/probe.ts:106agent-runtime/extensions/line/src/card-command.ts:148agent-runtime/extensions/line/src/card-command.ts:154agent-runtime/extensions/msteams/src/attachments/html.ts:33

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard142 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    agent-runtime/extensions/bluebubbles/src/attachments.ts:52agent-runtime/extensions/bluebubbles/src/media-send.ts:29agent-runtime/extensions/bluebubbles/src/media-send.ts:43agent-runtime/extensions/bluebubbles/src/media-send.ts:43

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    No SSRF sinksguard22 occurrences

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

    actions/dispatch-agent/dispatch.mjs:64agent-runtime/extensions/bluebubbles/src/types.ts:129agent-runtime/extensions/feishu/src/probe.ts:16agent-runtime/extensions/feishu/src/streaming-card.ts:31

    Fix: Allow-list destinations; reject arbitrary/loopback/link-local URLs.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Adoption & popularitylimited adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

    Fix: Adoption grows naturally with real-world use; this never gates the score.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseMIT

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Has a security policySECURITY.md present

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

  • Not checked
    No known-vulnerable dependenciesno lockfile found

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

  • N/A
    No install/post-install scriptsguardno published package

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time.

  • N/A
    Package name not typosquattingguardno published package

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • N/A
    Published with provenanceno published package

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

  • N/A
    Established maintainerno published package

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Pass
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardall remotes use HTTPS

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • Pass
    IAM / Authentication ScopingOAuth / PRM handling detected

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (38)

IRCLINEcardpairFeishuMatrixDiscordiMessagellm-taskMattermostfeishu_docBlueBubblesGoogle Chatfeishu_permfeishu_wikifeishu_drivememory_storeCopilot ProxyMemory (Core)MiniMax OAuthmemory_forgetmemory_recallMicrosoft TeamsMemory (LanceDB)feishu_app_scopesapi-docs-generatorGoogle Gemini CLI AuthGoogle Antigravity Authdb-migration-specialistfeishu_bitable_get_metaDiagnostics OpenTelemetryfeishu_bitable_create_appfeishu_bitable_get_recordfeishu_bitable_list_fieldsfeishu_bitable_create_fieldfeishu_bitable_list_recordsfeishu_bitable_create_recordfeishu_bitable_update_record