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io.github.SAP-samples/hana-cli

io.github.SAP-samples/hana-cli v4.202607.1

Security Trust Score
Grade F · Serious issues
Tier 1 · Public sourceHigh confidence · 98%
Declared MCP capabilities
ResourcesPrompts

This server scored F. Run it behind runtime policy enforcement so one bad tool call can't become an incident.

3 issues capping this score
  • criticalNo command-injection sinks — 9 occurrences
  • mediumNo install/post-install scripts — runs postinstall
  • mediumNo over-broad / destructive tools — 4 over-broad tool(s)
Reputation109stars28forks7.5kdownloads/mo18open issues18d agolast commit7yage

Security controls

Deterministic, evidence-backed. Score earned from passing controls; a failed guard caps it.

Model–MCP Runtime Guardrails

  • Fail
    User-in-the-Loop / Approval Scopeguard4 over-broad tool(s)

    No over-broad or destructive tools (arbitrary shell, bulk-delete) that warrant human approval. How many servers fail this?

    System AdministrationSystem ToolsAnalyze System PerformanceTroubleshoot System Issues

    Fix: Scope tools narrowly; avoid arbitrary command execution and destructive defaults.

  • Warn
    Strict JSON Schema Enforcementschemas not strict

    Tool inputs are constrained (additionalProperties:false), so unexpected arguments can't be smuggled in.

    Fix: Set additionalProperties:false and require explicit parameters on every tool.

  • Pass
    Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defensesguardno injection markers

    Tool/prompt/resource text is free of hidden instructions that could hijack the agent.

  • Pass
    Tool Definition Integrityguardtool definitions stable; no risky changes in version history

    Every consecutive version pair is diffed for new injection markers or destructive scope — a risky diff anywhere in history is a rug-pull (fail, durable); benign description drift warns.

Application Security Checks

  • Fail
    No command-injection sinksguard9 occurrences

    Untrusted tool input reaching a shell yields remote code execution. How many servers fail this?

    bin/hdbsql.js:49scripts/prepare-release.js:128scripts/prepare-release.js:141utils/btp.js:37

    Fix: Never pass tool arguments to a shell; use argv arrays with shell disabled.

  • Fail
    No install/post-install scriptsguardruns postinstall

    install hooks run arbitrary code on every consumer at install time. How many servers fail this?

    Fix: Remove preinstall/install/postinstall scripts, or document and minimize them.

  • Warn
    No path traversalguard14 occurrences

    Naive path checks let tools read/write outside intended directories (EscapeRoute-class).

    .github/hooks/post-tool-use.js:71bin/import.js:352bin/import.js:525bin/massRename.js:87

    Fix: Resolve to a canonical path and verify containment; reject ../ and symlinks.

  • Warn
    Dependencies pinned (lockfile)no lockfile found

    A lockfile makes installs reproducible and resistant to silent dependency swaps.

    Fix: Commit a lockfile (package-lock.json / pnpm-lock.yaml / poetry.lock).

  • Warn
    Published with provenanceno provenance attestation

    Build provenance attests the artifact was built from the claimed source by CI.

    Fix: Publish with npm provenance (--provenance) from a trusted CI.

  • Warn
    Established maintainersingle maintainer

    Brand-new / single anonymous maintainers raise takeover and malware risk.

    Fix: Publish under an established account/org; add multiple maintainers.

  • Warn
    Has a security policyno security policy

    A SECURITY.md gives a private path to report vulnerabilities.

    Fix: Add SECURITY.md with a disclosure contact and process.

  • Pass
    No dynamic code executionguardno sinks found

    eval()/exec()/Function() on tool-derived strings allows arbitrary code execution.

  • Pass
    No SSRF sinksguardno sinks found

    Fetching tool-supplied URLs can pivot into internal networks and metadata services.

  • Pass
    No unsafe deserializationguardno sinks found

    pickle/yaml.load/etc. on untrusted data can execute code.

  • Pass
    No committed secretsguardno secrets found

    Hardcoded keys/tokens in published source are live credentials an attacker can use.

  • Pass
    Credentials sourced from environmentreads credentials from environment

    Reading secrets from env/secret stores avoids hardcoding them.

  • Pass
    No known-vulnerable dependencies1 runtime deps, no known CVEs

    Runtime dependencies (parsed from the lockfile) are scanned against OSV.dev for published CVEs. Advisory: flagged dependencies lower the score but don't hard-cap it, since transitive reachability is unproven.

  • Pass
    Package name not typosquattingguarddistinct package name

    Names mimicking popular packages are a common malware delivery vector.

  • Pass
    Actively maintainedrecent commits

    Unmaintained servers don't receive security fixes.

  • Pass
    Repository not archivedguardactive

    Archived repositories will never be patched.

  • Pass
    Declares a licenseApache-2.0

    A clear license is required for legal enterprise use.

  • Pass
    Adoption & popularityestablished adoption

    A small, capped nudge from stars/downloads — widely-used servers get more eyes on bugs. It can never offset a real security failure.

  • Not checked
    Signed releasesnot evaluated

    Signed releases let consumers verify artifacts weren't tampered with.

Transport & Trust Model

  • Pass
    Execution Sandboxingcontainerized

    A container/sandbox image limits blast radius; a server that runs natively has full host access.

  • Pass
    Network Exposureno bind-all detected

    Binding 0.0.0.0 or exposing debug inspectors widens the attack surface.

  • N/A
    Transport Encryption (TLS)guardno remote endpoints

    Plaintext HTTP exposes traffic and bearer tokens to interception.

  • N/A
    IAM / Authentication Scopingno remote endpoints

    OAuth 2.1 / Protected Resource Metadata gates who can invoke tools.

  • N/A
    Live Endpoint Reachablenot dynamically scanned

    A dynamic scan connected to the declared remote endpoint and it responded — verified live, not a dead URL.

  • N/A
    Authentication Enforced (live)not dynamically scanned

    If the server declares auth is required, it must actually reject anonymous clients. Serving tools to unauthenticated callers is a real exposure.

Tools (80)

table--connformatschema--admin--debug--limit--table--dryRun--format--object--output--schemaSecurityfilename--profile--timeoutkey-basedData ToolsHANA Cloudfull-tablelarge-filequickstart--batchSizeall-columnsexport-dataimport-datasafe-importSchema ToolsSystem Toolsexcel-exportfull-profilequick-import--sourceTable--targetTabledefault-ruleshana_examplesquick-profile--sourceSchema--targetSchemaAnalysis ToolsHDI ManagementSecurity Audithana_recommendhana_workflowsstructure-onlyBTP IntegrationDeveloper ToolsMass Operationsfiltered-exporthana_quickstart--disableVerboseBatch Operationsexplore-databaseflexible-mappingstandard-compareBackup & RecoveryBackup and VerifyConnection & AuthData ManipulationObject Inspectionhana_get_templatehana_troubleshoothana_workflow_by_idhana_discover_by_tagSystem Administrationhana_interpret_resulthana_search_workflowsvalidate-data-qualityExport and Import DataPerformance Monitoringhana_parameter_presetstroubleshoot-connectionCompare and Clone Schemahana_discover_categoriesValidate and Profile Datahana_discover_by_categoryAnalyze System PerformanceTroubleshoot System Issueshana_conversation_templates